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ARTICLES' 
':1 . ':- .' . . . ~ , 
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TINKER"l AND OTHER , SAGAS IN THE; 
ACADEMIC "MARKETPLACE, OF IDEAS';,2 
, • ,;r.HOMAS c. FisC;;HER* 
• Professor of Law, New England School of Law. A.B. University of Cincinnati, 
1960; J.D. Georgetown University Law Center, 1966. All; rights reserved. 
1. The theme of this paper is taken from a well known American case decided by 
the Supreme Court in 1969, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503 (1969). I am very grateful to the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the 
University of London, and its Director, Terrance A. Daintith, for providing me with the 
incentive, a talk to Fellows of the Institute in March, 1991, that resulted in this paper. I 
also thank my Dean, John F. O'Brien, and Board of Trustees for giving me the freedom 
to affiliat~ with the Institute, and the Universities of Cambridge, Exeter, and Edinburgh 
during 1991. I am especially grateful to a former research associate of mine, Peter 
Farber, and to 'my current associate, Ric Goodwill, for their many contributions to the 
finished article. Finally, I thank Pam Critchfield of Golden Gate for her technical 
assistance. 
2. The concept that ideas should compete for ,acceptance in the public 
"marketplace" did not originate in America or in the U.S. Supreme Court. See 
LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576, n.3. The idea was first expressed 
in Supreme Court jurisprudence by the late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in a 
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Justice Holmes 
wrote that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought'to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market." [d. at 630. The concept was first applied to the field of. 
education by a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943): "[The education of] the young for citizenship is reason for 
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to 
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of 
our government as mere platitudes." [d. at 637. "To believe that patriotism will not 
flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead' of ... compulsory 
... is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds." 
[d. at 641. 
[d. at 642. 
[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter 
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of 
its substance is the right to differ as to things that, touch the 
heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed starin our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty;' 
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion .... 
351 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1969, with Holmesian flourish, Justice ·Abe Fortas de-
clared the rights of students and teachers in the academy: "[I]t 
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech at the schoolhouse 
gate,"S he wrote. That seemed a logical proposition; one that' 
would stand the test of time. But there was a caveat that, by 
now, has nearly swallowed the rule: these freedoms were gain-
safed only as long as their exercise did not "materially and sub-
stantially interfere"· with the educational mission or disciplinary 
processes of the school. Justices Harlan and Black dissented in 
Tinker, suggesting that students attend school to learn, not to 
teach constitutional values. Today, their dissent seems grimly 
prophetic. 
The case that is the uniform point of reference for this arti~ 
cle is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District. It began in late December, 1965, when Mary Beth 
Tinker, age 13, her brother John 15, and 16-year-old Chris Eck-
hardt wore black armbands to their school to evidence opposi-
tion to the war in Vietnam. ~ School officials were forewarned of 
the students' plan, and hastily adopted a policy under which any 
student wearing a black armband would be suspended from 
school until the armband was removed. When Mary Beth, John 
and Chris appeared, at school wearing armbands, they were 
promptly suspended for violating this school policy. 
The students' challenge to the policy reached the Supreme 
Court in late 1968.6 In February, 1969, the Court provided the 
constitutional framework for student exercise of First Amend-
ment rights within a public secondary school.' 
3. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
4. Id. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, ,749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
5. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
6. The Tinker Court did not address the issue of "prior restraint," since the peti-
tioners sought an injunction preventing the school authorities from. disciplining those 
who had worn the armbands. Prior restraint has become more of an issue in post- Tinker 
cases in which school regulations have been challenged on their face. Courts in prior 
restraint cases have to assess the reasonableness of a school official's estimate of the 
likelihood of a disruption in the less-exacting light of the Tinker "fore~ast" rule. 
7. With Justice Abe Fortas writing for a 7-2 majority, the Court declared that "First 
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environ-
2
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Justice Fortas characterized the wearing of armbands as 
"akin to 'pure speech' "8 and found that "in order for the State 
ment, are available to teachers and ·students." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
8. [d. at 505. I have never fully grasped the legal significance, if any, of the term or 
activity of "pure speech" as applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in Constitutional analy-
sis. In the twenty-five or so Supreme Court decisions that use that term, no clear defini-
tion is given, although several could be inferred. A common use, and the one used in the" 
.first case to incorporate the term, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), is to distinguish 
"pure speech" from the communication of ideas by "conduct:" "We emphatically reject 
the notion ... that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of free-
dom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct ... as these amendments afford 
to th~se who communicate ideas by pure speech." [d. at 555. Hence, it was my belief that 
"pure speech" referred to communication that was essentially visual, a sign or symbol, 
such as the black armband in Tinker, which the Court called "akin to pure speech," but 
also "symbolic speech." In this sense, the "speech" relied very little on verbalization or 
action, or, if published, consisted of very few words. Thus, its content was in the eyes 
(and mind) of the beholder. The "speech" was "pure" because it was largely unaffected 
by intimidation, haranguing, disruptive behavior, and so forth, which often blur the line 
between Constitutionally-protected expression and unprotected "acts," a distinction 
often made in the Supreme Court's Constitutional analysis. In the oft-cited Cox case, 
"pure speech" is distinguished from "conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing 
on streets and highways." [d. at 555. 
The same distinction appeared in Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 
(1967) regarding a parade ordinance, and in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 
U.S. 147 (1969). Apparently, the practice of Native American junior high school students 
wearing their hair in the style of Plains Indians was, like the armband in Tinker, "akin 
to pure speech," although in New Rider v. Board of Educ., 414 U.S. 1097 (1974) it was 
labeled "symbolic speech." [d. at 1099. Nude dancing, however, was alleged to involve 
"expressive acts as distinct from pure speech or representation . . . . " Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). Souter approved of the 
analysis employed in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), wherein conduct was 
contrasted with speech in the protest-burning of a draft card. In O'Brien the term "pure 
speech" was not only not used .. but the protagonist's allegation that his act of defiance 
was "protected 'symbolic speech' " appears to have been rejected by the Court majority. 
[d. at 376. This seems at odds with the definition of "pure speech" as purely visual, 
which the burning of a draft card, or flag, clearly is. However, the Court was disposed in 
O'Brien to focus on a prohibited act - the destruction of government property - and 
not on the acts' communicative content. In a later case, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 
396 (1974), the Court stated that, "O'Brien's activity involved 'conduct' rather than pure 
'speech.''' [d. at 411. If the "visual aid" definition were correct, one would also expect 
"pure speech" to be mentioned in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), in which Co-
hen walked through a court-house corridor wearing a jacket with the words "Fuck the 
Draft" emblazoned on the back. A verbal message to be sure, but communicated in a 
chiefly visual way. See id. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, of the three cases most 
likely to use "pure speech" in the visual sense (O'Brien, Tinker and Cohen) only Tinker 
uses the term at all. 
Other cases lending reinforcement to this view of "pure speech" are: Linmark Assoc. 
v. Willingboro 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 
558 (1980) (which speaks of the "transcendental constitutional value [of] pure speech"). 
This is as much of a definition as any Supreme Court case provides. Justice Marshall 
apparently would label as "pure speech" a student address to a compulsory high school 
assembly. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 690 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a partic-
ular expression of opinion, it must be able to show [or 'forecast'] 
that ... engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially 
and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school .... "9 
This so-called "Tinker test," used to determine when school 
authorities can constitutionally interfere with student free-
speech rights, was derived from two cases decided by the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals three years earlier: Burnside u. Byars lO 
However, Supreme Court jurisprudence appears to allow two other definitions of the 
term "pure speech," neither of which fit my understanding and theory, or the Tinker 
analysis. I do not reject either of them, but the second would vastly expand the way in 
which that term has normally been used by the Court. 
The first alternative definition of "pure speech" is "Speech or Debate in either 
House [of Congress]." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The context in which this phrase is 
cited in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (the Pentagon Papers case) 
suggests that "pure speech" is synonymous with "political speech." Hutchinson v. 
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), also uses the term in the Gravel manner. Yet, Gravel 
seems more clearly to reference Congress in debate, as opposed to Senator Proxmire's 
unofficial "Golden Fleece" award. [d. at 126. 
Another line of cases seems to define "pure speech" as the type of "political speech" 
the first amendment was quintessentially meant to protect. Namely, "words ... directed 
at [or about] public officials and their conduct in office." Gentile v. Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 
2720, 2724 (1991). ("There is no question that speech critical of the exercise of the 
State's power lies at the very center of the First Amendment. Nevada seeks to punish 
the dissemination of information relating to alleged governmental misconduct .... "). In 
rather clear accord with this view are Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), and 
Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975), both involving a federal statute prohibiting 
and punishing verbal threats to the President's life. 
Hence, it is not clear whether the Tinker majority uses "pure speech" in the sense of 
"symbolic," or visual, speech (which has fared rather well in Constitutional jurispru-
dence), or in the sense of "political speech," which is often limited by some sufficiently 
compelling, competing governmental interest. For all its lofty sound, "pure speech" does 
not appear to be a significant discriminator in Tinker and related cases. 
9. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
[d. at 508. 
The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners 
for a silent, passive expression of opinion unaccompanied by 
any disorder or disturbance on the part of the petitioners. 
There is no evidence whatever of petitioners' interference, ac-
tual or nascent, with the school's work or collision with the 
rights of other students to be secure and let alone. Accord-
ingly, this case does not concern speech or action that intrudes 
upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students. 
10. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). Students were suspended for wearing "freedom 
buttons" in violation of a school policy that prohibited "distracting and annoying con-
duct." The appellate court found no evidence of disruption and held the regulation to be 
arbitrary and capricious and an infringement of student rights of free expression. Unless 
speech-related activity by students on school grounds "materially and substantially in-
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and Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education.l1 Ac-
cepting a priori that the state has a compelling interest in main-
taining an orderly educational system, the Fifth Circuit refused 
to enjoin enforcement of a school regulation, and held in 
Blackwell that students' First Amendment rights can be 
abridged by state officials if reasonably necessary to protect 
other legitimate state interests. 12 In Burnside, however, where 
no disruption was shown, the suppression of student expression 
was found to be "arbitrary and capricious" and therefore 
unconstitutional. 
This foundation having been laid, the Tinker court merely 
applied the Burnside-Blackwell test to the facts at hand. 
In the last paragraph of his opinion, Justice Fortas re-
phrased the Burnside standard by inserting the word "forecast," 
thereby extending the reach of Tinker.ls Once the school rule 
was challenged, the Court put the burden on the administration 
to demonstrate a constitutionally-sufficient justification to regu-
late student behavior. But, in determining whether school offi-
cials are justified in "forecasting" disruption, Tinker requires 
only that a court find that their anticipation of potential disor-
der was not unreasonable.14 It is thus more difficult for a court 
to find fault with a school administration when its regulation has 
terfere[s) with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" 
said the court, such speech can not be prohibited. [d. at 749. 
11. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). Under facts similar to Burnside, the Blackwell 
court found a "complete breakdown in school discipline" resulted from the manner in 
which students displayed their buttons or attempted to get other students to wear them. 
[d. at 753. See also Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970) . 
. 12. [d. See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951); Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
13. The Tinker dicta requires that the record contain "facts which might reasonably 
have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference 
with school activities ... or the lives of others." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. Hence, school 
authorities would have to show actual disruption or some objective prospect thereof. 
14. Fortas stated that: 
But in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of 
expression .... In order for the State in the person of school 
officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of 
opinion, it must be able to show that its 'action was caused by 
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort 
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint. 
'[d. at 508-509. 
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acted as a prior restraint,1I1 and precluded the anticipated dis-
turpance from occurring. 
The Tinker court evidently accepted the legal proposition 
that high schools and their students might be judged by a lower 
constitutional standard than the public in general with regard to 
First Amendment rights. In Tinker, the state (school) had only 
to demonstrate a "legitimate" interest in regulation, rather than 
the "compelling" interest that often must be shown in such cir-
cumstances. Not only are students not adults, but a school is not 
a street corner. 
Justice Stewart, in his concurring OpinIOn, reminded the 
Court that the First Amendment rights of children are not co-
extensive with those adults: "[A] State may permissibly deter-
mine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child -
like someone in a captive audience - is not possessed of that 
full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of 
First Amendment guarantees. "18 
Prior to Tinker, and subsequently as well, the Supreme 
Court has frequently noted that states and school officials enjoy 
"comprehensive authority" to prescribe and control conduct in 
schools, at least when their actions are consistent with the Con-
.stitution.17 The student's interest in free expression has to be 
balanced against the state's interest in providing an effective 
public school system. State officials' latitude in formulating rules 
and regulations was limited only by the requirement that they 
be reasonably related to the maintenance of order within the 
system. The situations in which school officials' actions took a 
back seat to students' rights were rare indeed.18 
15. In what is essentially dicta, Fortas addressed the broader question whether a 
school regulation imposing a prior restraint could be challenged. on its face, prior to any 
violation of that rule. Outside the school environment, however, the Supreme Court has 
aggressively opposed regulations that act as "prior restraints." See Near v. Minnesota ex 
rei. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); New 
York Times Co .. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
16. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 629, 649·50 (1968». 
17. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923). 
18. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), West Virginia Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390. 
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But it is not for this balancing approach to allocating rights 
that Tinker is cited. Rather, it is for Justice Fortas' sweeping 
dicta regarding the Constitutional rights of students. "It can 
hardly be argued," he wrote, "that either students or teachers 
shed their constitutional rights· to freedom of speech at the 
schoolhouse gate."19 
The [Bill of Rights] protects the citizen· against 
the state itself and all of its creatures - Boards 
of Education not excepted .... That they are ed-
ucating the young for citizenship is reason for 
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms 
of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free 
mind at its source and teach youth to discount 
important principles of our government as mere 
platitudes.20 
Hence, from Tinker onward, 
[s]tudents in school as well as out of school are 
'persons' under our Constitution. They are pos-
sessed of fundamental rights which the state must 
respect . . . . IIi our system, students may not be 
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that 
which the State chooses to communicate. They 
may not be confined to the expression of those 
sentiments that are officially approved.21 
Is this rather sweeping grant of Constitutional protection to 
students workable? Personally, I doubt that a school at any level 
could opera,te effectively at the threshold of "material and sub-
stantial disruption." Indeed, the dissents of Justices Harlan and 
Black in Tinker forcefully assert that position. Black wrote that 
"[t]he Court's holding in this case ushers in what I deem to be 
an entirely new era in which the power to control pupils by the 
elected 'officials of state supported public schools .. .' is in ulti-
mate effect transferred to the Supreme Court."22 "[P]ublic 
school students [are not] sent to the schools at public expense to 
broadcast political or any other views to educate and inform the 
public. [T]axpayers send children to school ... to learn, not 
19. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
20. Id. at 507 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 
(1943)). 
21. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
22. Id. at 515. 
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teach."23 
The twenty-year retreat from the Supreme Court's bold, but 
ultimately unworkable, dicta in Tinker is the subject of this arti-
cle; the better to establish what we have learned in the process. 
Who was correct, Fortas or Black? Was the Tinker decision a 
"magna carta" for students and teachers, or did it represent 
something of a "high water mark" in the expansion of constitu-
tional "rights"24 for both groups, from which the U.S. Supreme 
Court has, by-and-Iarge, retreated ever since? The latter, it 
seems to me, proved true. I submit that the Tinker "test" was 
unworkable from the start and that lower courts, perceiving it to 
be so, began a retreat from it, joined eventually by the U.S. Su-
preme Court, that left the academy profoundly confused and 
significantly changed. 
II. THE CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
Over twenty years have passed since the Tinker case was 
decided. In that time, well over 40 major "education law" cases 
have been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court; exclusive of 
those dealing with public school integration and public assis-
tance to parochial schools. Cases of the last two types add signif-
icantly to that number. In the forty years prior to Tinker, the 
Supreme Court decided roughly ten "education law" cases. 
The gradual erosion of the sweeping guarantees implied by 
the Tinker decision was neither consistent nor uninterrupted. 
Generally speaking, however, students and teachers have lost 
rights over the past twenty years. In the process, the Supreme 
Court has established a iIew Constitutional balance and new le-
gal standards. 
First, the school environment has come to be viewed as 
unique and somewhat fragile. Second, teachers and administra-
tive officials have been accorded great discretion in managing 
23. Id. at 522. 
24. It is popular for civil libertarians to talk in terms of legal "rights," and the right-
privilege distinction in U.S. law. See Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 
(1961). However, as the rest of the paper will show, the value of a legal "interest" de-
pends very much upon how it is balanced against threats to its enjoyment in the eyes of 
a court majority. 
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the academy, particularly as regards academic decisionmaking, 
and their decisions are accorded the utmost respect 'by courts of 
law. Third, public school students are usually "captive audi-
ences" in the school environment, and do not enjoy the full 
rights of the public in general. Fourth, students may be entitled 
to some "process" to avoid arbitrary and capricious decisions by 
state officials, but far less process than is received by others 
faced with a similar exercise of state power. Fifth, younger chil-
dren have fewer rights than older students. Sixth, school officials 
have near-absolute and unreviewable control over activities 
which are considered part of their curricular or pedagogical 
responsibilities. 
The year 1969, however, seemed like a propitious time for a 
sweeping affirmation of the Constitutional rights of youth, and 
the proper functioning of the intellectual marketplace. The pub-
lic-service legacy of recently-slain President John F. Kennedy 
had captured the hearts and minds of many Americans; the 
country's horizons seemed unlimited. The most sweeping civil 
rights bill in U.S. history had just been passed; education legis-
lation and funding was pyramiding toward the Education 
Amendments of 1972;211 youth was finding its voice and feeling 
its power, and adults were growing more aware and respectful of 
it; and the Vietnam War had yet to deflate American self-confi-
'dence. In short, the times were economically, politically and le-
gally expansive. Everything seemed possible, given time, money 
and political will. Justice Fortas' dicta simply followed suit. 
But times did change, and significantly so. The Vietnam 
War opened political divisions that grew violent. The overblown 
promises of salvation through education failed to produce the 
expected return. Recession hit the U.S. economy and it lost he-
gemony in world markets. We as a people became less enchanted 
with liberalism and idealism, and became more fiscally and po-
litically conservative. And so did Supreme Court judgments re-
garding student and teacher rights. 
25. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, July 2, 1964, especially 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1971-74 (1988); Pub. L. 92-318, June 23, 1972. 
9
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III. STUDENT AND TEACHER RIGHTS 
In cases prior to Tinker, the U.S. Supreme Court estab-
lished that students, teachers and others had Constitutional 
rights in the academic environment/ol6 The majority of those 
early cases, however, dealt with the rights of adults or educa-
tional institutions.~17 It was not until 1943, in the case of West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, that the rights 
of students were squarely addressed by the Court. In Barnette, 
Justice Jackson delivered a bold opinion, favoring the right to 
free expression in the educational setting. He held that students 
may refuse to salute the flag when doing so would conflict with 
their religious beliefs.28 
In 1967, Keyishian had protected teachers against forced 
"loyalty oaths." Pickering, in 1968, gave teachers the same 
speech rights that other citizens enjoyed outside the classroom. 
These decisions, however, also involved adults, not students. Fi-
nally, in 1969, came Tinker. 
A thicket has grown up around the dicta of Justice Fortas, 
as different federal circuit courts have sought to apply the seem-
ingly simple standard of his brief, flamboyant opinion. Federal 
courts have had to adapt the Tinker "forecast" rule to a myriad 
of circumstances that arose in the school environment. As a re-
26. In 1819, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the Dartmouth College Case 17 U.S. (4 
Wheaton) 518 (1819), in which Chief Justice John Marshall upheld the rights of private 
colleges by holding that New Hampshire could not unilaterally modify the charter estab-
lishing Dartmouth College. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court held 
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prevented states from forbid-
ding the teaching of foreign languages to young pupils. Statutes of this sort, stated the 
Court, interfere with the liberty rights of parents, students and teachers. Pierce v. Soci-
ety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) upheld the right of parochial elementary and second-
ary schools to offer alternatives to public schooling as a "free exercise" of religion. 
27. See Meyer v. 'Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). _ 
28. "The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen 
against the State itself and all of its creatures - Board of Education not excepted, 
These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none 
that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights." Barnette, 319 U.S. at 
637. By the time Tinker was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court had already recognized 
teacher's rights of expression. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) 
(loyalty oaths); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (a teacher's right of free 
expression outside of the classroom is equal to other citizens', unless his statements are 
reckless, knowingly false and an impediment to school operations). 
10
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suIt, Tinker, as interpreted by lower courts, only faintly resem-
bles Tinker as written. 
'The most significant and widely-cited of the post-Tinker 
cases are Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education29 and Shanley 
v. Northeast Independent School District. so Both cases dealt 
with prior restraint of printed student material,31 In Eisner, the 
students challenged a school regulation requiring prior approval 
of printed or written matter intended for distribution on school 
grounds. This regulation provided that no material could be dis-
tributed "which, either by its content or by the manner of distri-
bution itself, will interfere with the proper and orderly operation 
and discipline of the school, will cause violence or disorder, or 
will constitute an invasion of the rights of others."s2 The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the school policy failed to 
meet the standards established in Freedman v. Maryland,Ss but 
rejected the petitioner's argument that Near precluded any 
prior review by public officials. Rather, the court held that Near, 
read in the light of Times Film Corp. and Freedman, allowed for 
prior restraint under appropriate circumstances. The Eisner 
court found that the Constitution did not forbid a properly-
drawn and applied school regulation, requiring submission of all 
material to school authorities before its distribution on 
campus.s• 
29. 440 F.2d 803 (2nd Cir. 1971). 
30. 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972). 
31. Regulations imposing prior restraints typically involve not spoken or symbolic 
speech, but written or printed material that its proponents distribute to a large audience. 
The seminal case on this subject is Near v. Minnesota ex rei. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), 
in which prior restraints were viewed as presumably unconstitutional. However, in Times 
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), the Court stated for the first time that 
prior restraints (on publications and films) are not necessarily unconstitutional under all 
circumstances. 
32. Eisner, 440 F.2d at 805. 
33. 380 U.S. 51 (1965) ,(holding a motion picture censorship statute unconstitu-
tional). The Court held that prior restraint must take place under procedural safeguards 
designed to obviate the dangers of government censorship. Those safeguards were: (1) 
the burden rests with the state to show that the film is unprotected expression; (2) an 
administrative decision to bar projection of the film is not final, but serves only to pre-
serve the status quo for a brief, fixed period; during which (3) the procedure must pro-
vide for prompt judicial review before final restraint is imposed. See id. at 58-59. 
34. Eisner, 440 F.2d at 807-11; ct. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919): 
"The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are 
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507: "[The] 
Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of 
11
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The Second Circuit followed the broad co~tours of Tinker, 
however, by holding that the school regulation could not be 
overbroad or vague.SII The regulation was strengthened by the 
fact that it did not authorize punishment, but only required 
prior submission, and applied only to students on school prop-
erty. The policy was defective, however, in that it lacked a pro-
cedure and time frame under which the review was to be con-
ducted. s6 Although it referenced the three requirements of 
Freedman, the Eisner court did not feel that Freedman had to 
be strictly followed in the context of a public secondary school. 
Hence, while students were gainsafed certain communicative 
rights by Tinker, Eisner might cause them to leave some of 
those rights at the school gate. Is not a student, or anyone, likely 
to alter his message if he knows it is subject to prior review? 
In Shanley, three high school seniors were suspended for 
distributing a newspaper of their own creation near, but outside, 
school grounds. The Fifth Circuit elected to address the broader 
Constitutional issue that is implicit in any attempt by school of-
ficials to limit student expression, rather than resolve the nar-
rower issue presented: the power of school officials to reach off-
campus student speech. No doubt, the court took its impetus 
from the fact that the school board insisted that its policy was 
Constitutional on both its face and as applied to the offending 
students. Decided just three years after Tinker, Shanley pro-
vides a more complete picture of the constitutional parameters 
of prior restraint of student speech. 
Taking note of the uniqueness of the secondary school set-
ting, the Shanley court asserted the now-familiar need for a con-
stitutional analysis tailored to that situation: "the exercise of 
rights of expression in the high schools, whether by students or 
by others, is subject to reasonable constraints more restrictive 
than those constraints that can normally limit First Amendment 
freedoms. "S7 The Tinker court also had recognized that public 
schools were special environments, but its "material and sub-
the States and of school officials ... to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." 
35. See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643 (1968). 
36. It did not specify what constituted "distribution," nor to whom and how the 
material was to be submitted. Neither did the rule prescribe a definite and brief period 
within which the review process would be completed. Eisner, 440 F.2d at 810-11. 
37. Shanley, 462 F.2d at 969 (emphasis added). 
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stantial disruption" test would not insulate them much from the 
hurley-burley of the public "marketplace of ideas." Not so in 
Shanley. The Shanley court found nothing unconstitutional per 
se about a requirement that students submit materials to the 
administration prior to its distribution on school grounds. "As 
long as the regulation for prior approval does not operate to sti-
fle the content of any student publication in an unconstitutional 
manner and is not unreasonably complex or onerous, the re-
quirement of prior approval would more closely approximate 
simply a regulation of speech and not a prior restraint."38 
The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, hewed closer to the 
Tinker line: 
The . . . editorial imputing a 'sick mind' to the 
dean reflects a disrespectful and tasteless attitude 
toward authority. Yet does that imputation . . . 
without more, justify a 'forecast' of substantial 
disruption or material interference with the 
school policies or invade the rights of others? We 
think not .... [M]ere expressions of [the stu-
dents'] feelings with which [school officials] do 
not wish to contend is not the showing required 
by the Tinker test . . . .39 
Whenever the school administration can demonstrate, as 
Tinker required, a reasonable cause to believe that the expres-
sion would result in material and substantial interference with 
legitimate school activities or with the rights of others,40 the 
Shanley court se.emed to approve the schools' general oversight 
of student communications, so long as there were certain safe-
guards. These might constitute time, place, or manner regula-
38. [d. 
39. Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 14 (7th Cir. 1970) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted). 
40. We do not here delimit the categories of materials for which a 
high school administration may exercise a reasonable prior re-
straint of content to only those materials obscene, libelous, or 
inflammatory, for we realize that specific problems will require 
individual and specific judgments .... We do conclude, how-
ever, that the school board's burden of demonstrating reasona-
bleness becomes geometrically heavier as its decision begins to 
focus upon the content of materials that are not obscene, 
libelous, or inflammatory. 
Shanley, 462 F.2d at 971. 
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tions that equitably balance the interests of students and the 
school. This is a far cry, however, from the jealous First Amend-
ment protection afforded in Tinker on campus or in the 
classroom. 
In the end, the Shanley court found two reasons to strike 
down the school regulation. First, the rule (as it stood) was over-
broad in that it subjected all student written expression to a 
prior restraint, without regard to the time, place, and manner of 
its distribution. And the regulation contained no standards to 
guide the reviewing authority when deciding whether or not to 
approve a given student publication for distribution. Second, the 
regulation violated students due process rights in that it lacked 
any procedure by which they were to submit materials, and it 
failed to establish a brief and definite time for review. Finally, it 
did not contain any method to appeal the school's decision. 
The Eisner and Shanley courts seemed to recognize that 
once school boards put appropriate procedures in place, officials 
could review and prohibit certain types of student expression 
which, in their objective judgment, were likely to disrupt school 
affairs. 
Of course, these cases dealt with student publications on or 
near school grounds. The Tinker principle should have even 
more vitality away from school, where the institutional mission 
is less likely to be affected. In Thomas v. Board of Education, 
Granville Central School District,41 for example, the Second 
Circuit ruled that a school board is powerless to punish a stu-
dent for publishing and distributing an underground newspaper 
away from school premises. "When school officials are author-
ized only to punish speech on school property, the student is 
free to speak his mind when the school day ends. In this man-
ner, the community is not deprived of the salutary effects of 
. ".2 expresslOn . . . . 
Moreover, whereas Tinker leaves the impression that all 
non-disruptive (and one· assumes non-illegal) speech is pro-
tected, later cases not only provided for review of content, but 
41. 607 F.2d 1043 (2nd Cir. 1979). 
42. Id. at 1052. 
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also suppression of legal content. In F.C.C. v. Pacifica Founda-
tion,"3 the Supreme Court recognized, once again, a distinction 
between the 'First Amendment rights of school children and 
adults, but this time in a more public forum. 
In Pacifica Foundation, the decisive factor was the 2 p.m. 
radio broadcast of George Carlin's "seven dirty words" mono-
logue. According to Judge Newman, concurring in Thomas, "[i]f 
the F.C.C. can act to keep indecent language off the afternoon 
airwaves, a school can act to keep indecent language from circu-
lating on high school grounds .... [T]he First Amendment 
gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's 
armband, but not Cohen's jacket.""" Admittedly, there were fac-
tors in Pacifica that were not present in Thomas, such as the 
fact that the airwaves are licensed and heavily regulated, a radio 
listener is something of a "captive," a~d such a listener could be 
immature and surprised by Carlin's broadcast. Even if the 
Pacifica holding is viewed as approving a time, place, and man-
ner regulation, it is more easily applied to children and schools 
than it is to adults and other public buildings, such as 
courthouses. 
In another revealing case, Trachtman v. Anker,45 the stu-
dent editor of a' school paper was refused permission to conduct 
a sex survey because school officials felt that many students 
would be psychologically harmed if confronted by the questions 
on the survey form. The district court ruled that the school offi-
cials' claims of potential emotional damage were unconvincing. 
But its judgment was reversed on appeal. 
The Second Circuit held that the evenly-balanced trial rec-
ord established a sufficient basis for the school board's belief 
that distribution of the questionnaire would result in harm to 
students throughout the school population. The Trachtman 
court thus extended Tinker's concern for "invasion of the rights 
of others" to psychological harms as well as physical interfer-
ences. And who better to identify these hard-to-prove, prospec-
43. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
44. Thomas, '607 F.2d at 1057. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court 
stated that "certain kinds of otherwise permissible speech [need not be] ... tolerated in 
certain places." Id. at 19. 
45. 563 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1977). 
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tive harms than professional educators? Certainly not federal 
judges, it seems. 
These two Second Circuit decisions indicate the extent to 
which Tinker can be enlarged, but also eviscerated, by well-
meaning judges. When Justice Fortas announced the "material 
and substantial disruption" test, he surely was not contemplat-
ing the effect that indecent language, or a sex questionnaire, 
might have on another student. After all, were not students to 
develop their citizenship skills in a robust exchange, protected 
by the First Amendment right up to the threshold of actual or 
imminent disruption? 
Thus did the minor caveat of Tinker, rather than its central 
theme, accord school officials a powerful weapon; a weapon made 
more potent by a great deal of judicially-mandated latitude for 
official discretion. 
Tinker was the easy case - there simply was no "disorder." 
It is not always so simple to discern the prospect or extent of 
potential disruption. If a balancing test is to be used, and that is 
generally the central issue in Constitutional litigation, will it 
favor students (Tinker), school officials (Trachtman), or be to-
tally neutral? Should school authorities be held to a high stan-
dard of proof of disruption or potential disruption, or can on-
campus expression be entirely prohibited if the reviewer is able 
to demonstrate some ground to believe that the exercise of ex-
pression would be potentially harmful to some students? 
As Tinker's promises grew increasingly dilute, only those 
situations that offered no evidence for a reasonable assessment 
of potential harm would cause an appellate court to enjoin en-
forcement of the school board's ban on expression. The posture 
of courts today seems to be one of substantial deference to 
school authority, and a disinclination to impose a judicial veto 
on matters of school discipline where there is any rational basis 
for the decisions of the school authorities. 
What lies in the future? Certainly, the level of disturbance 
that would support an abridgement of student rights has been 
judicially lowered since Tinker was decided. There is a danger 
that school officials, with near-unbridled discretion to forbid lan-
16
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guage they regard as inappropriate, may "seize upon the censor-
ship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the 
expression of unpopular views."46 This is especially true if "inde-
cent" language forms a part of student criticism of school poli-
cies or authorities, as is often the case. 
If all off-campus publication contains criticism of school of-
ficials, especially if indecent, the prospect of its eventual distri-
bution and impact within the institution increases. If the "inde-
cent language" holdings are grafted onto Tinker, it seems 
certain that future courts will find that school officials may pro-
hibit and punish on campus-and perhaps off-campus as 
well-any speech or publication that is offensive or threatens 
disruption, and probably preview it as well.47 
Of course, the academy has grown into a vastly more com-
plicated (and arguably dangerous) place since Tinker was de~ 
cided. School children, already maturing more quickly than 
might be conducive to "citizenship training," are bombarded 
with all sorts of "real life" messages, some of them terribly vio-
lent, narcissistic and overtly material. The muted, balanced "cit-
izenship training" of schools, if any, can become completely lost 
46. Cohen. 403 U.S. at 26. 
47. It is a general. if over-simplified. principle of Constitutional analysis that the 
victory of one position or party over another often depends upon the Constitutional 
"test" used by the court. Thus, an exacting test can create a burden for the defending 
party so great that it is virtually impossible to meet, or it can be so modest that it is 
easily met. As a general rule, state interference with a "fundamental right" (such as the 
first amendment rights of free speech and press) invites "strict scrutiny" from the court, 
which means the regulation is presumably illegal, and is very difficult for the state to 
justify, unless the state has a "compelling" reason for its action. Near v. Minnesota ex 
rei. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). A mid-level of court scrutiny is reserved for the protec-
tion of "important" rights which the state must have a "substantial" justification in or-
der to regulate. This degree of scrutiny is more common to equal protection cases, for 
example involving sex discrimination, than to first amendment cases. See Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190 (1976). The least searching degree of scrutiny in Constitutional analysis is 
"rational basis." It is the standard generally applied to the states~ "health and welfare" 
regulations. They are presumably valid if the state can show a "reasonable basis" for the 
regulation. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). "Time, place and 
manner" regulations, since they neither prohibit nor punish speech and press altogether, 
but simply regulate it in a content-neutral way, are normally given this lowest degree of 
scrutiny: Are they reasonable? However, outright bans of speech and press, or regulation 
based on the content of the message, is generally subjected to "strict scrutiny." 
It is instructive, therefore, in terms of the "value" placed on student speech and 
press, that Tinker applied the mid-range Constitutional test of "substantial" basis, and 
not the higher, "compelling" governmental interest test. See supra note 9 and accompa-
nying text. 
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in the process, particularly if it receives no reinforcement 
outside the school environment. Conversely, secondary school 
students may simply be making a plea for adult guidance, test-
ing authority simply to establish limits and boundaries that soci-
ety sometimes seems to lack and that may no longer be provided 
at home. 
In the twenty years since Tinker, other Justices ascended 
the high bench; Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens and 
O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger, appeared less eager than 
Justices Fortas, Brennan, Douglas and Marshall, and Chief Jus-
tice Warren, to recognize and extend civil liberties, and would 
even support curtailing student rights.48 Hence, schools have 
regained some of their authority, but at the expense of both 
teachers and students, especially minor students. 
Just one example of this is the refusal of the U.S. Supreme 
Court to extend Constitutional rights to students and teachers 
at private schools under the rubric of "public function" or "co-
venturing. " 
IV. THE DEMISE OF THE "PUBLIC FUNCTION" 
DOCTRINE 
Many legal analysts expected, indeed probably hoped,49 that 
a legal theory known as the "public function" doctrinellO might 
be used to extend Constitutional guarantees to students and 
48. This contraction of "rights" was evident elsewhere, in cases involving school in-
tegration and job discrimination, for example. See Brown v. Board of Educ. (1), 347 U.S. 
483 (1954); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); cf. Freeman 
v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); cf. Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
49. See Robert M. O'Neil, Priuate Uniuersities and Public Law, 19 BUFF. L. REV. 
155 (1969-70); THOMAS C. FISCHER, The Decline and Fall of an Artificial Distinction, in 
HIGHER EDUCATION: THE LAW AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, pp. 27-39, 
(D.P. Young ed., 1971). 
50. Portions of the U.S. Constitution, and particularly the bill of rights, protect in-
dividuals from over-regulation by government, often called "state action." The term 
"public function" refers to certain activities, the performance of which are "traditionally 
associated with sovereign governments, and which are operated almost exclusively by 
government entities." JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 457 
(4th ed. 1991). The argument is made that whenever a priuate entity undertakes these 
"public functions," that individual or entity ought to be subject to the same Constitu-
tional limitations as would be imposed upon the state, if it were the "actor." See id. 
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teachers at private schools. After all, this theory was used to ex-
tend free speech rights to persons in a privately operated "com-
pany town."61 Marsh, the case that gave the "public function" 
approach its original vitality, challenged the restrictions en-
forced in a small town in Alabama by its private corporate-
owner. Agents of the corporation had posted notices in th~ 
town's stores prohibiting vending and solicitation without writ-
ten permission. A Jehovah's Witness claimed that the rule could 
not be constitutionally-applied to her distribution of religious 
literature. The Supreme Court balanced the property rights of 
the corporate owner against the free press and religion rights of 
the complainant, and held that the latter occupied a "preferred 
position."62 The Court found that the "'business block' serve[d] 
as the community shopping center and is freely accessible [to 
everyone] .... The managers appointed by the corporation can-
not curtail the liberty of press and religion of these people con-
sistently with the purposes of the Constitution[] .... " 63 Thus, 
it came to be thought that private actors that conducted "pub-
lic" functions, like schooling, might be brought under the con-
straints of the Constitution. 
A slightly different legal approach was adopted, but to a 
similar end, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,64 this 
time to guarantee black citizens equal access to a "private" res-
taurant. The restaurant leased a portion of a government-fi-
nanced parking structure through an agreement with the city 
parking authority. The Supreme Court found that a mutually-
beneficial ("symbiotic") relationship existed between the govern-
ment operators of the 'garage and the restaurant, such that the 
discriminatory acts of the restaurant were not immunized from 
constitutional restraints as being wholly private.66 The notion 
seemed to be that, where government and private actors co-ven-
tured, "state action" might be found. 66 
51. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
52. [d. at 509. 
53. [d. at 508. 
54. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
55. See id. at 723-26. "[T]he commercially leased areas were not surplus state prop-
erty, but constituted a physically and financially integral and, indeed, indispensable part 
of the State's plan to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit." [d. at 723-24. 
56. State action has been defined as "state participation through any arrangement, 
management, funds or property." Cooper v. Aaron 358 U.S. 1,4 (1958). This definition is 
probably too general and sweeping for today's Supreme Court jurisprudence. See 
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Both the Marsh and Burton decisions contributed to the le-
gal notion that all schools (public and private) were either so 
infused with public interest or received support from the govern-
ment that they should be equally subject to Constitutional re-
straints. Are not schools the best environment in which to incul-
cate democratic values and respect for the rule of law? Are they 
not the places we expect to promote unfettered inquiry to pro-
duce better citizens? 
The theory is an inviting one, and was quite possibly the 
best way the Court had in 1961 to reach the discriminatory be-
havior it sought to prevent. Today, the government either uses 
its Interstate Commerce power67 or attaches conditions to the 
offer or grant of a variety of public support to private schools.68 
However, due to its enormous potential, the "public function" 
theory lived on in the hopes of school rights activists until it was 
conclusively settled in the 1982 U.S. Supreme Court case, 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn.69 
In truth, these "state action" or "public function" victories 
involved a matter of degree from the beginning.60 Clearly, the 
government's right to regulate "private" behavior could only go 
so far before it interfered with other "rights," also protected by 
the Constitution. This was so even when a "public function" was 
performed, or the state had a hand in regulating the private ac-
tion; perhaps even a considerable hand in doing SO.61 
It was a group of cases decided in the early 1970's, some-
times referred to as the "shopping center" cases, that most se-
verely eroded the "public function" doctrine and foretold its 
eventual demise in Rendell-Baker. 
The first of the shopping center cases, Amalgamated Food 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) infra note 59 and related text. 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1988). 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1988). See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
59. 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
60. It depends upon a "degree of state participation and involvement in discrimina-
tory action which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn." Burton 
v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961). 
61. See Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967); ct. Moose Lodge v. 
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
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Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza,62 followed the Marsh 
"public function" precedent63 by allowing peaceful union picket-
ers to exercise their First Amendment rights in the pick-up area 
of a non-union supermarket in a private shopping center near 
Altoona, Pennsylvania.6• The second of the cases, however, took 
a more restrictive view. 
In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,6r> the U.S. Supreme Court held, in 
a five to four decision, that the orderly hand-billing of draft and 
war protestors could be excluded from the public areas of a pri-
vately-owned shopping center. Although generally open to the 
public, these areas were not so "dedicated" to public use as to 
permit handbilling unrelated to the shopping center's opera-
tions, held the Court majority.66 Justice Marshall, who wrote the 
majority opinion in Logan Valley, clung to his previous view re-
garding public function, and was joined by Justices Brennan, 
Douglas and Stewart in dissent. The "public function" theory 
was clearly· losing ground, even as the size of the shopping cen-
ters increased.67 
The final case, Hudgens v. NLRB,68 flatly reversed Logan 
Valley and adopted the anti-"public function" First Amend-
ment posture of Lloyd Corp.69 This time, only two Justices 
(Marshall and Brennan) dissented.70 
The rule emerging from the shopping center cases was ap-
plied to the field of education in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 
wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held that a disgruntled voca-
tional counselor and teachers at a private special-needs school 
could be dismissed by its director without violating their First 
(free speech) and Fourteenth (due process) Amendment rights. 
This was so notwithstanding the fact that the school performed 
62. 391 U.S. 308 (1968). 
63. [d. at 316-19. 
64. [d. at 324-25. 
65. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
66. [d. at 568-70. 
67. See id. at 571-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
68. 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
69. [d. at 518-21. 
70. See id. at 525-43. Note, however, that the free speech rights the dissenters ar-
gued for under the U.S. Constitution, have been found to exist, in limited and specific 
situations, in state constitutions. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 
74, (1980); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 388 Mass. 83 (1983). 
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a statutorily-mandated "public function," and relied on public 
funds for at least ninety percent of its operating budget. Appar-
ently, the "public function" theory has lost all of its former 
force, and the public/private co-venturing approach rises to the 
level of "state action"71 only if the private action was "compelled 
or ... influenced by [the state]."72 At least this is so unless 
some other federal legislation regulates private conduct.73 
Occasionally, there arises a factual circumstance in which 
"the state has so insinuated itself with the ... [private actor] as 
to be considered a joint participant in the offending actions."74 
One such situation arose in the discipline of students at a pri-
vate school for maladjusted youths, because the state had invol-
untarily placed most of them there. Cases of this sort are in-
creasingly rare. 
Thus did Rendell-Baker expunge the final ray of hope that 
"public function" analysis could be used to leverage civil rights 
into private schools, even those that owed their very existence to 
government. Indeed, the Supreme Court's latest pronouncement 
on this subject strikes a judicious balance between individual 
and governmental interests in a state-operated, "nonpublic fo- . 
rum" (a po~t authority air terminal): In International Society 
for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,75 the Society's adherents were 
allowed to proselytize in the general public interior areas of air 
71. To support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights suit, the dismissal had to have been 
made "under color of law." "[O]ur holdings have made clear that the relevant question is 
not simply whether a private group is serving a 'public function.' We have held that the 
question is whether the function performed has been 'traditionally the exclusiue preroga-
tive of the State.''' That a private entity performs a function which serves the public 
does not make this act state action. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842 (citing Jackson v. 
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974». 
72. [d. at 841. "The school ... is not fundamentally different from many private 
corporations whose business depends primarily on [government) contracts ... ." [d. at 
840-41. 
73. [d. at 837-38. 
74. Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 940 (10th Cir. 1982) (citing Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961». In Milonas, the allegedly "private" actions 
were the disciplining of students, many of whom were involuntarily placed in the school's 
care by juvenile courts and other state agencies, pursuant to "detailed contracts," and 
under "extensive state regulation." Thus, there was a sufficiently close nexus between 
the state's sending boys to the school, and the conduct of the school authorities, so that 
it was taken "under color of law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Cf, National Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). 
75. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992). 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/2
1993] "MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS" 373 
terminals, but not to solicit funds. This was so because the facil-
ity was "dedicated" to another function than communication, 
and thus "limitations on expressive activity . . . need only be 
reasonable to survive."76 If that is so, then the same standard 
would doubtless apply to public schools; likewise "dedicated" to 
a specialized public function (education). 
One last thing might be said before closing this section on 
the application of individual rights and guarantees to private 
schools, and that is that the government can regulate private un-
dertakings (including schools), and has, under its Interstate 
Commerce power,77 or as a condition to a grant of government 
largesse.78 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is an example 
of the former approach.79 Title IX of the Educational Amend-
ments of 1972,80 the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act of 1975,81 and the conditions attached to federal guarantees 
of student loans are examples of the latter.82 However, these ob-
ligations apply to private schools only if they are drawn within 
the terms of the legislation, or if schools accept the public fund-
ing offered. The rights conferred on individuals are limited to 
the express terms of the act, so that many schools, teachers, stu-
dents and activities may be left uncovered in the private sector, 
unlike 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which covers every civil rights violation 
"under color" of law, federal, state and local. 
V. ACCESS TO INFORMATION/STATE-CONTROLLED 
MESSAGES 
Passing beyond those cases in which "state action" is gar-
bled or lacking, we address a long line of cases in which the "ac-
tor" is a public school board, official or teacher, as in Tinker. In 
these cases (the remainder of this article addresses mostly this 
type), the issue is not whether the Constitution applies, but 
76. [d. at 2702 (emphasis added). 
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
78. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 
458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1988). 
80. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988). 
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (1988). 
82. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1088-1099 (1988), especially § 1094. See also, e.g., B. Tucker, Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act After Ten Years of Enforcement: The Past and the 
Future, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 845. 
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rather to what degree an individual's interest is protected 
against a competing state interest.8s Thus, most of these cases 
pit the interest of the state in an educated, responsible and pro-
ductive citizenry against an individual's right to act as he or she 
chooses, even if that behavior limits or thwarts the state's de-
sign. Obviously, there is some merit to both sides of the argu-
ment, and courts are drawn into the dispute as neutral "refer-
ees" and line-drawers. The line drawn between the two 
competing interests makes all the difference, of course, and, as 
we have seen, the line is not always drawn predictably. More-
over, a divided court will often offer some support to both sides 
of the argument, giving each hope for the future, regardless of 
where the line is drawn.in the instant case. 
The tension between these competing "rights" and interests 
is amply illustrated by a modest, but important, group of cases 
that I refer to as the "book-burning" cases.8• The conflict in 
these cases takes essentially two forms. The school may decide 
that, for moral or pedagogical reasons, certain materials do not 
belong, or that certain lessons ought not to be taught, in the 
school environment. Hence, they seek to remove or restrict 
them. Alternatively, either students or their parents object to 
school materials or lessons and seek to alter or eliminate them.811 
The best example to date in U.S. Supreme Court jurispru-
dence is Board of Education v. Pico,88 involving the question 
whether the school board has the authority to remove certain 
books from the school library. The Supreme Court first gave a 
nod in the direction of the school's prerogative, stating that "lo-
cal school boards have broad discretion in the management of 
school affairs .... " Then it recognized the competing Consti-
tutional rights of students, parents and teachers, stating that 
"[this discretion] must be exercised in a manner that comports 
83. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), for example, the "free exercise" (of 
religion) rights of the Amish to educate their children as they thought best were pitted 
against the state policy of compulsory secondary school education. 
84. These cases bear no resemblance to Ray Bradbury's FARENHEIT 451. 
85. N. Lichtenstein, Children, the Schools, and the Right to Know: Some Thoughts 
at the Schoolhouse Gate, 19 U.S.F. L.REV. 91 (1985); M. Yudof, Library Book S.election 
and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527 (1984); 
T. van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Government Authority to Incul-
cate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REV. 197 (1983). 
86. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
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with the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment."87 
In the end, the Court remanded the case for a trial on the mer-
its, after suggesting a "formula" by which to judge whether the 
removal of books from a school library was Constitutional or 
not: "[If the school board] intend[s] by their removal decision to 
deny ... access to ideas with which [persons] disagree[], and if 
this intent [is] the decisive factor in the ... decision, then [the 
school board has] exercised [its] discretion in violation of the 
Constitution. "88 Thus, the apparent arbiter of constitutionality 
is whether the school board's action is directed at removing from 
student purview information already nominally judged suitable 
and available. Public attention is far more focused on an act of 
removal, and therefore the "intent" behind it, than it would be 
on the more common act of selecting books for the library collec-
tion (or designing curriculum) in the first place. If restraint is to 
be exercised, arguably the latter situations are the places to ex-
ercise it. Removal of the offending books might be accomplished 
in the ordinary course of "culling" the collection, and not at the 
behest of some bowdlerizing board member or parent.89 
In Grove v. Mead School, a Ninth Circuit case, a parent 
complained that the school board's refusal to remove a book 
from a curricular reading assignment violated both his child's 
right to "free exercise" of religion and the constitutional prohi-
bition against the state's "establishment" of religion, contained 
in the First Amendment.9o The line between a school system's 
traditional role in inculcating morals and social responsibility in 
students and the promotion of partisan Christian religiosity is, 
indeed, a fine one;91 but it is one that has favored the generally-
benign judgment of school officials in all but the most extreme 
cases.92 
A much more subtle case, however, is now seeking Supreme 
87. Id. at 863-64. 
88. Id. at 871. 
89. Pica, 457 U.S. at 861-62 and 870-71; see also Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d 
1528 (9th Cir. 1985). 
90. Mead Sch. Dist., 753 F.2d at 1533-34. 
91. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) society's legitimate interest in gen-
eral public education was forced to give way to the peculiarities of a well-established 
religion (Amish). 
92. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 
39 (1980). 
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Court review.93 In that case, the school itself objected to a fifth-
grade teacher's keeping a copy of the Bible and other religious 
books on his cluttered desk, and reading it silently during peri-
ods set aside for individual activity. 
A similar restriction on the free flow of information was ap-
plied to teachers in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local 
Educators' Assn.94 Rival teacher unions squabbled over access 
rights to an intraschool mail system and teacher mailboxes, as a 
representation election approached. One union was given exclu-
sive access rights to the system by virtue of its existing collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, while the other union challenged that 
agreement as violative of its First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. The Supreme Court found no such violation, holding that 
"[t]he differential access provided [to the mail system and mail-
boxes was] reasonable because it was wholly consistent with [the 
school] District's legitimate interest in "preserving [school] 
property ... for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated".9G 
"Nowhere have we suggested," said the Court, "that students, 
teachers, or anyone else has an absolute constitutional right to 
use all parts of a school building or its immediate environs for 
. unlimited purposes."96 
That may be true, for a public school is not as freely acces-
sible as, say, a public park or sidewalk. Nevertheless, did not the 
Supreme Court say in Tinker that rights were to be preserved 
unless their exercise was "materially and substantively [disrup-
tive]"? The mailboxes undoubtedly served as a conduit for im-
portant "political" information, useful to the teachers in making 
important political choices. Allowing equal access to them is, at 
best, a minor inconvenience to school operations. Notwithstand-
ing, the balance was struck in favor of school prerogatives and 
comfort, not the limits of the Constitutional rights enshrined in 
Tinker. 
93. Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), ce~t. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2791 
(1992). 
94. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
95. [d. at 50. Obviously, schools are "dedicated" principally to the process of learn-
ing. But that ought to include communications with and between teachers about the 
terms of their employment contract. 
96. [d. at 44 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 194, 117-18 (1972». 
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In Bethel School District v. Fraser,97 the Supreme Court 
took a quantum leap forward in its protectionist jurisprudence, 
ostensibly shielding minors from offensive, rather than obscene, 
speech.98 In Bethel, Tinker's protections were not extended to a 
student who gave to a high school assembly a speech that con-
tained thinly-veiled sexual references.99 The Supreme Court 
held that the First Amendment did not protect Fraser's sugges-
tive speech, nor prevent the School District from disciplining . 
him. The Court distinguished Tinker, stating that Fraser's 
speech was "unrelated to any political viewpoint,"I00 although it 
was made in the context of a student election camp~ign. 
It would have made more sense if the Court had fastened 
upon the "captive and immature" audience, or the potential for 
"disruption," to justify the school's restriction.101 However, the 
facts of Bethel would not seem to make out a better case for the 
latter than would the facts of Tinker. Hence, the Court majority 
stated simply: "The First Amendment does not prevent the 
school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and 
lewd speech ... would undermine the school's basic educational 
mission. "102 That may be true, but where was there any proof of 
this prospect? Is it possible that school authorities overreacted 
to innocent, if immature, "acting out," simply to keep the acad-
emy non-controversial (and bland)? 
97. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
98. Cf, Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 
U.S. 726 (1978) both of which could easily be justified as time, place and manner regula-
tions, not outright prohibitions. There are other factual peculiarities, as well, that distin-
guish these cases from the circumstances and dicta of Tinker. 
99. With nearly 600 fellow students in attendance, Matthew Fraser delivered a 
speech nominating another student for student elective office: 
I know a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's 
firm in his shirt, his character is firm - but most . . . of all, 
his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. 
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it 
in. If necessary, he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He 
doesn't attack things in spurts - he drives hard, pushing and 
pushing until finally - he succeeds. 
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end - even the cli-
max, for each and everyone of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. 
vice president - he'll never come between you and the best 
our high school can be. 
478 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
100. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685. 
101. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 749-50. 
102. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685. . 
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Thus, the Supreme Court drew the line, once again, in favor 
of school authorities, giving them the power to regulate student 
behavior on "moral" grounds, although the innuendo the speech 
contained was probably common in discourse among teenage 
students, and (depending upon which Justice you believe) there 
was no disruption. 
This case epitomizes the choice confronting the Court after 
Tinker; restoring the compromised authority of school adminis-
trators, or protecting students' and teachers' new-found liber-
ties. As we are learning, the line redrawing almost universally 
favored the school. 
There is yet another "free· communication" issue of the 
Bethel sort that has recently bedeviled schools, and that is so-
called "hate speech".I03 The U.S. Supreme Court confronted its 
first "hate speech" case in its 1991-1992 term, R.A. V. v. City of 
St. Paul, Minnesota, but not in the educational setting. lo4 The 
problem of regulating such speech in the public marketplace is 
different, of course, from its regulation in schools, where "social-
ization" is one of the "lessons" taught. But that should not be 
achieved at the expense of personal opinions and individualism. 
This is not the first time the Supreme Court has addressed 
purposefully anti-social speech and acts, of course. In two recent 
well-known cases, the Court held that there is a potential speech 
interest to protect in the burning of a draft card/oil or our na-
tion's flag. loa They have held that there should be similar protec~ 
tion for anti-social expressions of "viewpoint," as in R.A. V., un-
less it is shown that the action or response thereto presents a 
threat to the public that government has a right to regulate at 
103. This usually takes the form of shouted slogans or graffiti, but sometimes ap-
pears in legitimate student newspapers (e.g. the Dartmouth Review) as a statement of 
opinion or belief. Generally, the message is intentionally and overtly hostile to some seg-
ment of the school population, and purposely demeans and vilifies it, often with the 
intent, and result, of causing hostile, and equally-caustic reaction. Hate speech is anti-
social in both form and intent, but otherwise a legitimate (and generally protected) form 
of political expression. The disruption it causes, or is likely to cause, is entirely different, 
and can be dealt with under Tinker's caveat. 
104. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
105. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
106. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 
2404 (1990). 
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the expense of the speaker's "liberty."lo7 Such circumstances are 
not easy to demonstrate. This is so even if the speaker or actor 
is deliberately provocative; like a neo-Nazi march through a 
predominantly Jewish neighborhood. lOB 
Although the Supreme Court declined to hold the St. Paul 
"hate speech" ordinance "overbroad,"lo9 it had no difficulty 
finding the ordinance "facially unconstitutional."l1o This was so 
despite the construction the Minnesota Supreme Court gave the 
statute,lll limiting it to "fighting words."ll2 That construction, 
far from giving the government the authority to punish the po-
larizing effects of "hate speech," shrank its authority to those 
situations in which it would have a clear right to proscribe or 
punish otherwise protected speech or acts not because of their 
content, but on the legal grounds of trespass, assault, property 
damage and so forth. Thus, the peculiar class of speech that the 
statute was passed to address, "hate speech," may continue un-
punished (except in the more extreme forms noted) until and 
unless it is perceived to have a greater negative social impact 
than now appears to be the case, or the speech is given lower 
"value" in the hierarchy of Constitutional protection.1l3 
In the public sphere, then, we are left with Justice Brandeis' 
formulation of some years ago: "If there be time ... to avert the 
evil [of falsehood] by the proce~s of education, the remedy to be 
applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency 
can justify repression. "114 This solution does not appear to be 
107. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548. In the O'Brien case, such an interest was found. It 
was the government's interest in the maintenance of an orderly selective service system. 
In other cases, reason could be found if the speech or act (or more often reaction to it) 
threatens to "[incite] imminent lawless action," Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969), or the speaker's acts constitute "fighting words," that is, they have a "direct ten-
dency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom [they are] ... addressed." 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
108. In the mid-1970's, a neo-Nazi group sought to march through a predominantly 
Jewish neighborhood in Skokie, Illinois. The march touched a national nerve and 
sparked debate over the scope of first amendment rights. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 
1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (19.78). 
109. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542. Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
110. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547. 
111. Id. at 2542; cf. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985). 
112. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
113. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
114. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (em-
phasis added). 
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the one envisioned by St. Paul, or by academic institutions that 
have passed similar "hate speech" codes. Rather, they want to 
regulate the speaker in the interests of a normative society; ex-
pressly rejecting the Court's protection for provocative "speech" 
in Tinker. 
Of course, there is always the remote prospect that the Su-
preme Court, or a majority of its members, will feel that "hate 
speech" is such a threat to society that First Amendment pro-
tections ought to be relaxed in order to permit its regulation. 
Even if that view never prevails, it does not mean that the 
R.A. V. analysis will be applied to schools' attempts to regulate 
similar speech "on campus."llG 
After all, the R.A. V. case only addressed a criminal ordi-
nance that forbade and punished a form of political speech in 
the public marketplace of ideas. This whole article is meant to 
demonstrate how schools have been treated differently in the 
balancing of individual and institutional prerogatives. Thus, I 
cannot share the view of some that the R.A. V. decision necessa-
rily represents a "death knell for [school] speech codes" or 
"turns most ... [existing] codes into hamburger."llG 
Intolerance and confrontation seem to have been increasing 
recently on campus and, as inculcators of morals, ethics and val- . 
ues, educators have a legitimate reason to encourage positive so-
cial behavior within the school environment and to punish that 
which threatens the intellectual community, in terms of its 
peace, of course, but possibly its "mission" as well. Tinker recog-
nized this; and Bethel School applied it to speech that was "of-
fensive to ... modesty and decency."l17 After all, school codes 
. of behavior are not criminal statutes, and educators are not po-
lice. Moreover, courts of law generally give educators wide dis-
cretionary latitude to regulate the school environment; much 
more than would be given civil authority to regulate the public 
marketplace. A content-based regulation poses some problems to 
be sure, but the Supreme Court has not rejected them utterly, 
115. C{. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
116. The Chronicle of Higher Education, July I, 1992, at 1 and accompanying story 
at A19. 
117. Bethel .. 478 U.S. at 678-79. 
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particularly where the welfare of youth is involved.118 While the 
latitude granted to school officials will probably be greater in the 
case of primary and secondary schools than colleges and univer-
sities, a thoughtfully justified and drawn (and locally-enforced) 
"hate speech" regulation might be permitted on campus - par-
ticularly those polarized or threatened by factional ferment - in 
ways that would never be permitted in St. Paul. 
Although Justice Brandeis favored "education" to "repres-
sion," some schools are just as likely to pursue the latter 
method, particularly if they are either completely committed to 
their role of inculcating civility in their students,119 or the prob-
lem of "incendiary speech" IS severe in that school 
environment. 120 
VI. SCHOOL REGULATION OF "STUDENT 
NEWSPAPERS" 
Few other areas of so-called "school law" have evoked so 
much litigation as student publications, in a variety of forms.121 
Admittedly, a number of the early cases involved college and not 
secondary-school newspapers,t22 but Tinker (although it in-
volved "free speech") gave no reason to believe that ,students' 
free press rights were not equally implicated.123 
The majority of these cases, whether they arise at secondary 
or post-secondary institutions, involve student newspapers that 
receive some support from the institution. As a general rule, 
118. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747 (1982). 
119. See generally Bethel, 478 U.S. at 675. 
120. Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1970). 
121. J. DUSCHA & T.C. FISCHER. THE CAMPUS PRESS: FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, 
American Ass'n of State Colleges & Univs., D.C., 1973. 
122. See, e.g., Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Ed., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 
1967); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970); Channing Club v. 
Board of Regents, 317 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 
1257 (7th Cir. 1971); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D.Colo. 1971); Joyner v. Whit-
ing, 341 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D. N.C. 1972), reu'd, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973). 
123. The first amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in relevant part, "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom ... of the press .... "This prohi-
bition is extended, through the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, to state ef-
forts to control the press. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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cases do not involve "house organs," however.124 Two secondary-
school cases decided in 1977, Gambino v. Fairfax County School 
Boardl2 r. and Trachtman v. Anker,128 set the stage for an even-
tual U.S. Supreme Court ruling. It would be ten years before 
that decision finally came, in Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier.127 When it did, the Court took a position that 
eroded the "guarantees" of Tinker even further. The Gambino 
and Trachtman cases presented the polar positions from which 
the Supreme Court chose in Hazelwood. 
Gambino involved an article submitted for publication in 
The Farm News, a student newspaper published by a public 
school in Fairfax, Virginia. The principal reviewed the contents 
of the article, entitled "Sexually Active Students Fail to Use 
Contraceptives," and found that certain portions violated school 
policy and should therefore be deleted. The principal agreed, 
however, that the remainder of the article (a survey of student 
attitudes toward contraception) could be published. The student 
editors brought suit, claiming that the whole article should be 
printed. The federal district court agreed, and enjoined the 
school from interfering with the publication of the article. u8 The 
Fourth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the lower court that the 
School Board had established The Farm News as a "public fo- . 
rum for student expression," and hence "the general power of 
the Board to regulate course content [did] not apply."12s 
Trachtman also involved a school official's pre-publication 
disapproval of a student article. The principal of Stuyvestant 
High School in New York City prohibited student staff members 
of the school newspaper, The Stuyvestant Voice, from distribut-
ing a sex questionnaire to fellow students and publishing the re-
sults in the newspaper. The Second Circuit found that "school 
authorities did not act unreasonably in deciding that the pro-
posed questionnaire should not be distributed" on school prop-
erty. This is a far cry from the "compelling state interest" test 
124. See DUSHCA & FISCHER, supra note 121, at pp. 59-71; Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260, 262-66 (1988). 
125. 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977). 
126. 563 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1977). 
127. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
128. 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va. 1977). 
129. Gambino, 564 F.2d at 158 (emphasis added). 
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ordinarily used. The fact that "harmful consequences might re-
sult to students" if the questionnaire were distributed and the 
results published, was found by the court to be a substantial 
basis for restraint, within the "forecast" requirements of 
Tinker.130 Thus, the standard of judicial review was garbled, but 
clearly lower than that ordinarily applied to censorship. 
Hence, the U.S. Supreme Court had a clear choice when the 
Hazelwood case came along. Indeed, that case might be said to 
fall into that category (curriculum-based publications) excepted 
by the Fourth Circuit in the Gambino decision. 
Hazelwood inv.olved a school newspaper known as the Spec-
trum. The high school principal, to whom page proofs of the 
newspaper were routinely given for review prior to publication, 
objected to the contents of two articles scheduled to appear in 
the Spring issue.131 Without fully consulting the journalism advi-
sor, or developing adequate facts, the principal decided to delete 
the two pages on which the objectionable stories were due to 
appear. 132 
In a bare majority opinion authored by Justice White, the 
Court upheld the authority of the principal to regulate the con-
tent of a newspaper that it found was "school-sponsored" and 
"part of the curriculum." The principal had this authority, the 
majority felt, because the Spectrum was not a traditional public 
forum. ISS The Court held that, since public schools "do not pos-
sess all of the attributes of streets, parks and other traditional 
public forums" they must ·"by policy or by practice" be opened 
before "indiscriminate use by the general public" would be al-
130. Trachtman, 563 F.2d at 519-20 (emphasis added). 
131. One of the stories described three students' experience with pregnancy, while 
the other discussed a divorce and its impact on a student attending the school. With 
respect to the article on teenage pregnancy, the principal believed that the references to 
sexual activity and birth control were "inappropriate." He was also concerned that, al-
though the girls' names were not used in the article, their identities might be deduced 
from the text. The principal also believed that the parents referenced in the divorce 
story "should have been given an opportunity to respond to [certain remarks contained 
in the article] ... or to consent to their publication." Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263. 
132. The deleted pages also contained articles on teenage marriage, runaways, and 
juvenile delinquents, and a general article on teenage pregnancy. 
133. The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's view that the Spectrum was a public 
forum because it was "intended to be and operated as a conduit for student viewpoint." 
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 265-70. 
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lowed. The Supreme Court majority found no "intent [by school 
officials] to open the pages of the Spectrum to 'indiscriminate 
use' by its student reporters and editors, or by the student body 
generally." Instead they "reserve[d] the forum for its intended 
purpose," as a "supervised learning experience for journalism 
students." Accordingly, the Court distinguished Tinker and held 
that "school officials were entitled to regulate the contents of 
[the] Spectrum in any reasonable manner."13' 
There is no discussion in Tinker about the school opening 
its venue to student discourse. Nor did the Tinker "forecast" 
rule use a "reasonableness" standard. Rather, the school was 
presumed to be open to student expression (the general public is 
a red herring) until and unless school authorities can establish a 
"substantial" reason for closing it to such discourse. The needs 
of the curriculum, of course, are one such reason. But that would 
apply, even if Hazelwood School qualified as such, to only a lim-
ited number of student newspapers. 
The Court found that, unlike Tinker, which involved indi-
vidual "student speech," Hazelwood involved "[a] school-spon-
sored publication[] ... [an] expressive activit[y] that students, 
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to 
bear the imprimatur of the school." Therefore, "[e]ducators are 
entitled to exercise greater control [over this form of expression 
and] ... do not offend the First Amendment by exercising edito-
rial control over [its] style and content . . ~ so long as their ac-
tions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns. "1311 This is an ambiguous standard, because most school 
newspapers do bear the school's "imprimatur" in some way, but 
most are not curriculum-related, at least in any formal manner. 
The Supreme Court thus expressly rejected the Eighth Cir-
cuit's application of the Tinker standard to Hazelwood, for the 
lower court had found "no evidence in the record that the prin-
cipal could have reasonably forecast that the censored articles or 
134. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267-70 (emphasis added). 
135. These "legitimate" concerns include "assur[ingJ that participants learn 
whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not ex-
posed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the 
views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school." [d. at 271-
73. 
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any materials in the censored articles would have materially dis-
rupted classwork or given rise to substantial disorder in the 
school."138 This difference of legal perspective may be made 
compatible, if Hazelwood is limited to its special facts. 
There is no real dispute that the Spectrum was published as 
part of a curricular offering (ie. Journalism II class). There is no 
real doubt in my mind, and indeed I predicted some years ago, 
that academic institutions have near full control over academic 
and curricular vehicles, what I then called "house organs."137 If 
narrowly construed, the holding in Hazelwood is compatible 
with that legal view, and does no great damage to Tinker's prin-
ciples, except for refusing to expand them. The Hazelwood dicta 
is another matter. It suggests that school officials can not only 
exercise considerable control over "lessons," even if somewhat 
extra-curricular, but also act as "thought police," protecting stu-
dents from "material that may be inappropriate to their level of 
maturity," or which might be "erroneously attributed to the 
school."13s The former of these positions was purposely limited 
by Tinker, and the latter can be accomplished by much less in- . 
trusive means than the censorship practiced in Hazelwood. 
If Tinker's goal was to allow into the school "marketplace of 
ideas" all information that would not cause disruption, or inter-
fere with the school's proper mission, was not the Hazelwood 
School principal a bit ham-fisted in his attempt to censor the 
articles? The principal testified that he had no objection to the 
other material due to appear on the pages that contained the 
censored articles. Yet, rather than deleting just the objectionable 
stories, the principal deleted both pages in their entirety. He did 
not even explore with his journalism instructor other ways to 
balance the interests of students and school. 
The dissent, authored by Justice Brennan and joined by 
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, suggested that the school 
could have published a disclaimer, or "issue[d] its own response 
clarifying the official position on the matter and explaining why 
the student position is wrong." Said they: "Tinker teaches us 
that the state educator's undeniable, and undeniably vital, man-
136. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 265 (emphasis added). 
137. DUSCHA & FISCHER, supra note 121. 
138. Hazelwooq" 484 U.S. at 271. 
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date to inculcate moral and political values is not a general war-
rant to act as 'thought police' stifling discussion of all but state-
approved topics and advocacy of all but the official position."139 
The dissenters felt the majority opinion illustrated "how readily 
school officials (and courts) can camouflage viewpoint discrimi-
nation as the 'mere' protection of students from sensitive 
topics. "140 
Simply put, the lesson of Tinker seems to be that students 
possess, even at school, all those Constitutional rights that 
school officials cannot justify taking away; whereas Hazelwood 
reverses the equation, and accords to students only those rights 
that school administrators allow. This would be less threatening 
to students' budding Constitutional rights if Hazelwood was lim-
ited to curriculum-related matters, which seemed to be the ma-
jority's central premise. The narrow factual circumstances of 
Hazelwood are likely to be ignored or quickly forgotten, whereas 
the substantial grant of authority to school officials is likely to 
endure; indeed grow. 141 
Two other recent Supreme Court cases deserve at least 
some mention, due to their somewhat contradictory outcomes 
respecting the Constitutional rights of student authors. In one, 
Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri,142 
the Supreme Court refused to allow the University's dismissal of 
a graduate student for distribution on school grounds of an "un-
derground" newspaper, the Free Press, which contained materi-
als that allegedly violated a University rule against "indecent 
conduct or speech."143 The case involved a university and not a 
high school, of course, and the lower courts held the material to 
be "obscene" (which it was not). Moreover, it is possible that 
schools could set a stricter standard for on-campus communica-
139. [d. at 285-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
140. [d. at 288. 
141. Immediately upon the heels of the Hazelwood decision, local newspapers car-
ried stories of several incidences of attempted school censorship of student newspapers 
that were not part of the curriculum. See Student Editors Brace for Censor's Hand, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 14, 1988, at 28; Paper Gets F from Some Medfield Teachers, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1989, at 17; cf. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
142. 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam). 
143. [d. The front cover of the paper displayed a cartoon depicting club-wielding 
policemen raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice. Articles elsewhere in 
the paper contained offensive or indecent language. 
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tions than could be set in the public marketplace, in the interest 
of "decency."u4 In a terse per curiam opinion, however, the Su-
preme Court reversed the lower courts, stating: "the First 
Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard 
in the academic community with respect .to the content of 
speech."I411 The Supreme Court's protection of the student's 
right in Papish cannot be fully explained by the fact that the 
newspaper was not school-supported (although the facts of Pap-
ish are closer to Tinker than Hazelwood); nor that the student 
audience was more mature and less captive than that in Hazel-
wood, since a large number of teenagers were involved. Rather, 
the messages of Ms. Papish were legitimate expression in the 
academy, as was Ms. Tinker's, and were not likely to upset a 
media-saturated teenager of today. 
The second case, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily/46 also involv-
ing a university, took just the opposite approach. In Zurcher, a 
college newspaper's office was searched, pursuant to a valid war-
rant, by police officers looking chiefly for photographic evidence 
of' a violent collision between students occupying a campus 
building and police officers sent to remove them. In the course of 
the search, "photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks and 
wastepaper baskets were searched." Although "[l]ocked drawers 
and rooms were not opened ... [t]he officers apparently had 
[an] opportunity to read notes and correspondence during the 
search .... "147 Thus, the search, even if warranted by a magis-
trate, approximated a "fishing expedition," and far exceeded the 
scope of a search of a general-circulation newspaper that a court 
is likely to permit, although no such case has been reviewed by 
the Supreme Court. us While the Supreme Court precedent de-
nying news-reporters a general Constitutional privilege against 
revealing their confidential sources to a grand jury investigating 
criminal conductU9 is cited as a justification for the Zurcher out-
come, the Branzburg case is surgically-precise in its analysis and 
application when compared to the cavalier dismissal of the Stan-
144. Id. at 669 
145. Id. at 671. 
146. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
147. Id. at 551. 
148. Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
149. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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ford Daily's concerns in Zurcher. 1110 
VII. DUE PROCESS/CHIEFLY ACADEMIC 
At least since the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decided 
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, un the rights of 
students to a certain degree of process (allegedly that "due" 
them) prior to their dismissal from public institutions for disci-
plinary infractions has been fairly well established. I112 The pro-
cess guidelines prerequisite to faculty dismissals go somewhat 
further back in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. IllS Some 
schools have granted students and teachers more process than is 
required by the Constitution. This extra degree of protection, if 
legally guaranteed in school literature, such as a catalogue, a stu-
dent or faculty "handbook" of rules and regulations, or in a dor-
mitory contract, are entitlements conferred by contract, rather 
than by the Constitution, just as process protections, if any, are 
generally guaranteed by contract at private schools.111• 
In any event, this area of school law is so well covered in the 
literature,11111 and generally so well known and enforced by school 
officials, that there is little purpose served in repeating it here. 
Far less well explored is the process due to students dis-
150. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 563-66; cf. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 573-74 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
151. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). As do many 
authors, I trace the modern legal tradition of procedural due process for students in 
disciplinary proceedings to' Dixon which, for its time, was a thoughtful and constructive 
opinion. 
152. I explored this .subject in a fairly comprehensive "White Paper" for the Ameri-
can Association of State Colleges and Universities in 1970, entitled Due Process in the 
Student-Institutional Relationship, AASCU Studies, ERIC Clearinghouse, Washington, 
D.C., 1970. That study influenced The Report of the President's Commission on Cam-
pus Unrest, U.S. G.P.O. (1970). See also WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE, Procedural Due Process 
and State Uniuersity Students, 10 UCLA L. REV. 368 (1963); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 
565, 576 n.8 (1975). 
153. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Pickering v. Board of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). All of these cases were decided before GOBS v. Lopez, 
419 U.S. 565 (1975), the first student due process decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
154. See generally FISCHER, supra note 152 at 4-5. 
155. See, e.g., MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATION POLICY AND THE LAW 333-82 (3d ed. 
1992); H.C. HUDGINS, JR., & RICHARD S. VACCA, LAW AND EDUCATION: CONTEMPORARY Is-
SUES AND COURT DECISIONS 311-45, (3d ed. 1991). 
38
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss2/2
1993] "MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS" 389 
missed for academic reasons. Perhaps this is because the U.S. 
Supreme Court has been loathe to recognize a clear Constitu-
tional "right" in such situations. lli6 The jurisprudence also is not 
nearly as rich as that involving disciplinary due process. The 
Court's first decision in this field did not come until 1978: Board 
of Curators v. Horowitz.lli7 Two more decisions followed swiftly 
on its heels; Board of Regents of the University of the State of 
New York v. Tomanio,Ili8 and Regents of the University of 
Michigan v. Ewing. lli9 
The first, Horowitz, the so-called "dirty fingernails" case/60 
set a fair, and perhaps even generous, standard of process, prior 
to the academic dismissal of a probationary medical school stu-
dent in her last year of study. Although the outcome may seem 
harsh, the student involved was given ample notice of her aca-
demic deficiencies, a second opportunity to prove herself to an 
impartial non-faculty panel (loosely characterized by the Court 
as an "appeal"), and was measured by an objective, even demo-
cratic, standard of performance.I61 In that respect, all members 
of the Court felt that the school gave Ms. Horowitz all of the 
process to which she was entitled. That said, however, the ma-
jority raised the question whether Ms. Horowitz had any legal 
interest (liberty or property) in her' further education, to which a 
due process right might attach. I62 "Assuming," but not deciding, 
that she did, the Court noted that: 
156. None of the reported cases are generous to the student, but, as a general rule, 
they require some process and consistency from the school in its dealing with allegedly 
academically-deficient students. The latest case, however, Regents of the Univ. of Michi-
gan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985), not only gave the student very little process, the 
university was relieved of the consistency standard as well. 
157. In Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), the Court noted that 
[m]isconduct and failure to attain a standard of scholarship 
cannot be equated. A hearing may be required to determine 
charges of misconduct, but a hearing may be useless or harm-
ful in finding out the truth concerning scholarship. There is a 
clear dichotomy between a student's due process rights in dis-
ciplinary dismissals and in academic dismissals. 
[d. at 87-88 n.4 (citing Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 449-50 (5th Cir. 1976)). 
158. 446 U.S. 478 (1980). 
159. 474 U.S. 214 (1985). 
160. The moniker derives from the failure of the medical school student to pass her 
clinical requirements, in part for a lack of concern for personal hygiene, including dirt 
under her fingernails. 
161. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 82-92. 
162. [d. at 84. 
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The ultimate decision to dismiss [Ms. Horowitz] 
... was careful and deliberate ... [and that 
there was a] significant difference [for due process 
purposes] between the failure of a student to 
meet academic standards and the violation by a 
student of valid rules of conduct .... [F]ar less 
stringent procedural requirements [are necessary] 
in the case of an academic dismissal. 183 
Since the principal disciplinary due process case, Goss v. Lopez, 
required only an informal give-and-take between student and 
administrator (although that case involved a short-term suspen-
sion),164 it is difficult to imagine what "less" the student 
threatened with academic dismissal is entitled to. 
Indeed, the Horowitz Court majority concludes that stu-
dents facing academic dismissal may be Constitutionally "due" 
little or no process, that courts of law are ill-equipped to make 
such judgments, and should exercise "care and restraint" before 
interposing themselves in school academic processes, at least 
when there is no evidence of arbitrary or capricious conduct165 
by the school. 166 . 
The second case, Tomanio, is not nearly as generous as re-
gards process as was Horowitz, although the "academic" judg-
ment seems equally well-supported on its facts. Ms. Tomanio's 
civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could, and did, turn 
entirely on whether it was time-barred in federal court. The sub-
stance of her claim, however (addressed by some members of the 
court), raised the question whether an unlicensed chiropractor, 
who had failed to pass a New York licensing examination after 
seven attempts, was Constitutionally-guaranteed a hearing of 
some sort before her written request for a waiver of the exami-
nation requirement was rejected by the University board. The 
Tomanio majority did not address the merits of the case, it be-
ing unnecessary to their decision. Justice Stevens, concurring in 
163. [d. at 85-86. 
164. 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975). 
165. This is the least-probing judicial standard of review of public administrative 
decision-making. The court's review inquires not whether the decision made was the best 
or correct one, but only whether it could not be reasonably supported by the facts. Thus, 
it is virtually impossible to prove that the decision was objectively wrong. 
166. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 87-92; cf. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 97-108 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
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the result, and Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting, how-
ever, felt some process was due,167 notwithstanding the fact that 
New York's statutory scheme placed waiver requests "in the dis-
cretion of the Board of Regents."16S On the facts, this discretion 
did not appear to have been abused, although the whole purpose 
of a hearing is to determine whether there was official abuse of 
discretion or not. Nothing, however, in the jurisprudence of aca-
demic due process (or disciplinary due process, in many cases) 
guarantees a face-to-face hearing with the decision-maker.169 
The most recent case, Ewing, is, from a factual perspective, 
no more compelling than the other two. The Supreme Court's 
prompt and unanimous dispatch of the case may reflect a grow-
ing impatience on its part with the whole genre. Once again, the 
Supreme Court did not conclude that voluntarily-enrolled stu-
dents in public college academic programs had any property in-
terest in their continued enrollment or graduation. Instead, the 
Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that Mr. Ewing did. 
Then they unanimously held that Mr. Ewing's dismissal from a 
six-year undergraduate-plus-medical degree program (Inteflex) 
was legally justified, since he failed, at the end of his fourth year 
of study, five of seven subjects on a two-day written test admin-
istered by the National Board of Medical Examiners.17o 
The Court was probably justified in concluding that a pam-
phlet, entitled On Becoming a Doctor, was more descriptive 
than contractual when it suggested that failing students were 
"provided [an opportunity] to make up the failure in a second 
exam,"l71 and that Mr. Ewing had been given an ample opportu-
nity to plead his case in person before University authorities.172 
This does not fully justify, however, the University's deviation 
from its own written representations and past practices.173 The 
167. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 492-99. 
168. [d. at 494 (emphasis added). 
169. [d. 
170. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 215-22. 
171. [d. at 219. 
172. [d. at 216-17. 
173. Not only did the brochur& memorialize the commitment of the school to allow 
retesting, history revealed that, of the 32 students who had failed Part I of the exam, 
including 7 Inteftex students, all were allowed to retake the test at least once. [d. at 219. 
"Ewing was the only University of Michigan medical student who initially failed the 
NBME Part I between 1975 and 1982, and was not allowed an opportunity for a retest." 
[d. at 221. 
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only justification can be - since schools ought to be bound by 
their voluntary commitments, whether Constitutional or con-
tractual - that the school's decision was not arbitrary.174 
Rather, according to the Court, it ','was made conscientiously 
and with careful deliberation, based on an evaluation of Ewing's 
academic career."176 In the opinion of the unanimous Court, 
judges who review "genuinely academic" decisions, "should show 
great respect for the faculty's professional judgment."l76 
Hence, the Supreme Court has unflinchingly taken the posi-
tion that academic decisions are not nearly as "adversarial" as 
disciplinary actions, and that academic decisions require exper-
tise that the Court generally does not ,possess. Moreover, the 
Court is predisposed to assume that the academic decision-
maker has acted fairly, and not on the basis of any malevolent 
motive. Consequently, the Court has, for the most part, refused 
to inject itself into academic decisionmaking. 
Thus, except for the seemingly modest retreat in academic 
process from Horowitz to Ewing, it would be false to say that 
students have lost any great degree of constitutional protection 
from academic decisions since Tinker; they never had much in 
the first place. 
Whereas some due process is accorded in disciplinary pro-
ceedings,177 even that modest amount of process has been 
eroded.178 In its opinions, the Supreme Court appears to counte~ 
nance school officials' impatience with affording "process" in 
every action they take. The Court has elected to leave the ques-
tion of process more in the hands of school officials, except in 
extreme cases. 
174. Ewing received the lowest failing grade ever earned on Part I of the NBME in 
Michigan's program. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 216. 
175. [d. at 225. 
176. [d. at 225 (quoting Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 96 n.6 (Powell, 
J., concurring)). 
177. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (school administrators are required to pro-
vide minimum requirements of notice and hearing prior to a ten-day suspension). 
178. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (teacher and principal need only exer-
cise normal prudence and restraint when deciding to administer corporal punishment for 
disciplinary purposes); see also, Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (two-day 
loss of rights for delivering lewd speech to school assembly). 
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The last two areas upon which I wish to touch are religion 
and search and seizure in public schools. 
VIII. FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF 
RELIGION179 
A long line of well-known cases, beginning with Lemon v. 
Kurtzman,180 has established the circumstances in which grants 
of public largess to private (mostly parochial) sc4001s would "es-
tablish" religion, thereby violating the First Amendment. Far 
less attention has been given to the question whether the refusal 
to bestow equal public largess on private schools, or to grant re-
ligiously-conscious students and teachers certain freedoms in 
public schools, inhibits the "free exercise" of religion (also guar-
anteed by the First Amendment). 
In one of its earlier school cases, West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette, the U.S. Supreme court held (during 
war time) that schools could not force their students to salute 
the nation's flag, thereby compelling a belief in the country.18l In 
later cases the Court forbade forced prayer/82 refused to allow 
the posting of the Ten Commandments in classrooms,183 and 
struck down a state statute that required the teaching of "crea-
179. The first amendment states in relevant part: "Congress shall make .no laws re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. U.S. CONST. 
amend. 1. One commentator has paraphrased the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regard-
ing the establishment clause as follows: 
The free exercise clause means that a person may believe what 
he wishes. He may believe in his God or no God, and govern-
ment may not interfere with that belief. The establishment 
clause means that government is neutral in matters of religion. 
It does not favor one religion over another, many religions 
over some, or all religions over none. It does not promote one 
religious activity over another nor does it compel participation 
in a religious activity. 
HUDGINS & VACCA, supra note 155 at 399. 
180. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). State statutes providing state aid to church-related ele-
mentary and secondary schools violate the Constitutionally-required separation of 
church and state: the so-called "wall of separation." 
181. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). "If there is any fixed star in our constellation, it is 
that no official, high or petty, can describe what shall be orthodox in politics, national-
ism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein . . . ." 
. 182. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (although 
students could be excused therefrom upon their parents' written request). 
183. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
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tion-science" to balance Darwinism.ls• 
Only Wisconsin v. Yoder recognized a right to the "free ex-
ercise" of religion, when it held that "the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments prevent the state from compelling [the parents of 
Amish children] to cause their children to attend formal high 
school to age 16."ISII But this was a "parental rights" case, not a 
"minors' rights case" and it did not involve the right to "free 
exercise" in school. This difference in the enforcement of the es-
tablishment and free-exercise cl~uses caused some Justices to 
opine that the Court's aggressive exclusion of religion from pub-
lic schools represented not "neutrality," but "hostility" towards 
it. ISS 
It was not until the passage of the Equal Access Act in 
1984,ls7 that minor school children were given a free exercise 
right to pursue their religious interests, along with other secular 
interests, in public schools. The Act only applied to schools that 
accepted federal funds and created a "limited public forum. "ISS 
Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v. 
Mergens,189 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1990, ad-
dressed the application of the Equal Access Act ("the Act") to 
Westside's refusal to allow a student religious group, the Chris-
tian Bible Study Club, permission to meet on school premises 
184. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
185. 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). 
186. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 84-85, 106-107 (1985) (comparing 
opinions written separately by O'Connor, concurring, Burger, dissenting, Rehnquist, J.J., 
dissenting). 
187. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1984). The Act's legislative history indicates that it 
was passed to "clarify and confirm the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, 
freedom of association, and free exercise of religion which accrue to public school stu-
dents who desire voluntarily to exercise those rights during extracurricular periods of the 
school day when the school permits extracurricular activities." S. REP. No. 357, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2306, 2349. 
188. It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which re-
ceives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited 
public forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or 
discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a 
meeting within that limited forum on the basis of the reli-
gious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at 
such meetings. 
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988). A "limited public forum" meant that the school recognized or 
sponsored student activities that were not related to the curriculum. 
189. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
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during non-instructional time. The Court held that once a feder-
ally-funded public secondary school created a "limited open fo-
rum," it could not deny access to or discriminate against any 
"noncurriculum related student group" based on the religious, 
political, or philosophical content of the students' message. l90 A 
majority of the Court found that the Act did not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment, since it did not 
"favor" religion per se, but only put all non-curricular clubs on 
an equal footing. Thus, it was a "free speech" entitlement, like 
Tinker. 
The only type of student organization that appeared to 
need this type of Congressional assistance was a religious group, 
and if the object of the legislation was to assist those groups, 
even to gain equal access, it would violate the first "prong" of 
the so-called Lemon test, and be unconstitutional. l9l Recogniz-
ing this problem with the much-used, but now dated, Lemon 
test, a plurality of the Court, led by Justice O'Connor, argued 
for a more flexible "endorsement" test to measure "establish-
ment" clause violations, and required the school to provide ac-
cess to the religious student group.l92 
190. [d. The Court examined closely the Act's use of the terms "noncurriculum re-
lated student group," and "limited open forum." Justice O'Connor, writing for the ma-
jority, suggested a broad interpretation of "noncurriculum" to accommodate Congress' 
intent that a low threshold trigger application of the Act. [d. at 239-40. If the Court 
narrowly defined those groups that are directly related to the school's curriculum, it 
would ensure that schools could not attempt to claim, as Westside did, that all student 
groups are curriculum related, and hence the Act inapplicable. [d. The Court then con-
cluded that since Westside did allow such non curriculum-based groups as the "Sub-
surfer" and Chess club, the school maintained a "limited open forum" under the terms 
of the Act. 
191. This famous "test," first completely articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), provided that a public act supporting religion would violate the 
Constitution's prohibition against "establishment" if it violated anyone of three 
"prongs," sequentially: (1) that it have a secular legislative purpose; (2) that it have a 
"principal" or "primary effect" that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) that 
the state and its administration must avoid excessive government entanglement with re-
ligion. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
192. O'Connor's opinion upheld the lower court's application of her own "endorse-
ment" test, a reformulation of the Lemon test, which she first introduced in her concur-
ring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). This test reformulates the first 
two "prongs" of the Lemon test, by asking whether the government endorsement "con-
vey[s] or attempt[s] to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is 
favored or preferred." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). The inquiry into the government's intent is defe~ential and limited, unlike the 
secular purpose prong of the Lemon test, which concerns the government's subjective 
intent, and the second prong which focuses on the government's objective effect. In a 
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Congressional legislation concerning whether students 
should be allowed to pursue religious interests during nonin-
structional time blunted the usual scope of the Court's Constitu-
tional analysis of this issue; namely, the tension between the 
Free Speech and Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment on 
the one hand, and its Establishment Clause on the other. The 
Court had been inching towards a change of posture on this dif-
ficult constitutional question for years, but chose not to use 
Mergens for that purpose. The next opportunity it had, in the 
Court's latest school "prayer" case, Lee v. Weisman/ 93 the ma-
jority backed away even further. ' 
In any event, Mergens ~eems to be a victory for students. 
By balancing the right of students to express themselves against 
the need for schools to exercise control over the educational en-
vironment, the court leaned in favor of the students. Bravo 
Tinker! However, one commentator has suggested the Court has 
"underestimated the potential danger of government endorse-
ment of religious speech and provided a backdoor access for or-
ganized prayer to enter public schools."194 
Whether it enters through the "backdoor" or frontdoor, the 
issue is not "entry" but reentry. The truth is that, but for a zeal-
ous, but leaky, effort during the latter half of this century to 
hermetically seal public primary and secondary schools against 
religion, there has been a certain "tradition" of religiosity associ-
ated with American life and institutions.196 The Supreme Court 
has already allowed for it at public ceremonies,196 and in public 
colleges,197 and now, as a result of Mergens, public secondary 
case decided this term, many people thought a majority of the Court might finally adopt 
O'Connor's test, thereby supplanting the Lemon test. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 
(1992) 
193. 112 S. Ct. at 2649. The lower courts enjoined the practices, applying the Lemon 
test. Twenty amici briefs were filed in the Lee case. 
194. LEAH GALLANT MORGANSTEIN, Board of Education of Westside Community u. 
Mergens: Three "R's" + Religion = Mergens, 41 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 221, 222 (1991); see 
also Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 772 F. Supp. 531 (W.O. Wash. 1991). 
195. This was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Marsh v. Chambers, 465 
U.S. 785 (1983), involving a publicly· paid chaplain who opened each session of Ne· 
braska's legislature with a prayer. The establishment clause was not violated due to this 
"nation's history of religious acknowledgment." 
196. Id.; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
197. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), although the right of college students 
to conduct religious worship services in a public school building was based chiefly on free 
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schools. 
Lee, however, hews a little closer to the Constitutional line . 
. Whereas the students in Mergens were entirely self-selected and 
engaged in an optional activity, Lee involves a public school 
commencement ceremony which, although not compulsory, is 
often not considered truly optional. Hence, the audience is 
somewhat "captive,"198 and may merit protection from the cere-
mony's invocation and benediction which, while purposely non-
denominational, still were delivered by clergy and constitute a 
"prayer" of sorts. Is this Constitutionally offensive? 
A liberal reading of the Lemon test might have allowed the 
practice to continue, for the impact of this particular act in the 
context of the larger event may render it harmless in an estab-
lishment sense.199 Conversely, a majority of the Court might 
have finally embraced Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" test, 
and still find that these official acts violated it. In fact, the Su-
preme Court majority took neither of these positions in Lee.20o 
Instead, Justice Kennedy took the labori.ng oar and wrote a 
five to four decision in which Justice O'Connor joined. She also 
joined in separate, concurring opinions by Justices Blackmun 
and Souter, but wrote no opinion of her own. Perhaps this was 
because she finally despaired of garnering a fifth vote for her 
"endorsement" test, although I personally doubt this. If it were 
so, it would be sad indeed. For hers is an eminently fair and 
balanced test for an accommodation of both church and state. 
Perhaps Justice O'Connor was preoccupied by the narrow 
five to four consensus she was building in an abortion case, up-
holding Roe u. Wade. 201 Or she may honestly believe (as well she 
might) that even ecumenical invocations and benedictions have 
no place in public secondary graduation ceremonies. That is, the 
Lee case may be limited to its facts, as Justice Kennedy some-
what suggests in his opinion.202 After 'all, attending one's own 
speech, and the university'S attempt at content-regulation in this case. 
198. Cf. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
199. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
200. 112 S. Ct. at 2649. 
201. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
202. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. 
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graduation ceremonies is really not a matter of choice for most 
students or their parents. Hence, they constitute a virtual cap-
tive, minor audience, and compelled religious acknowledgement 
in that setting goes beyond that approved in both Widmar and 
Marsh. 
Whatever the situation, Justice Kennedy, with majority 
backing, was unequivocal in his statement that "[t]his case does 
not require us to revisit the difficult questions dividing us in re-
cent cases ... the accommodation by the State for the religious 
beliefs and practices of many of its citizens .... Thus we do not 
accept the invitation of petitioners ... to reconsider our decision 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman."203 Hence, it would appear that Lemon 
is the operative establishment "test" for the foreseeable future 
- at least in "easy cases" - and, using that test, there is very 
little room in public school for religious "speech." How then will 
we deal with, for example, a university professor who occasion-
ally refers to his religious beliefs in his lectures?204 Or a fifth-
grade teacher who makes no secret of his Christian beliefs, albeit 
without overt proselytizing?20I1 Will the Supreme Court's accom-
modating posture in Mergens be ignored by lower.courts,206 es-
pecially after Lee's ringing affirmation of Lemon? 
All told, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area has 
become increasingly picayune, without truly succeeding in insu-
lating public schools from religious expression. It also risks some 
ridicule, as resulted in its foray against "obscenity."207 Most im-
portantly, it should evidence that public secondary 'school stu-
dents are not the programmable automatons that the dicta in 
these cases might infer, and that they are capable of sifting and 
judging even "religious" messages for themselves. 
203. [d. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
204. Bishop v. Delchamps, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
3026 (1992) 
205. Roberta v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
2791 (1992). 
206. See Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist., 772 F. Supp. 531 (W.D. Wash. 1991). 
207. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754-56 (1982). 
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IX. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SEARCHING 
STUDENTS ON SCHOOL GROUNDS 
The final area for discussion involves the Fourth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution, and its prohibition against unrea-
sonable search and seizure, as applied in the academic setting. 
The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and .seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly· describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Questions regarding what makes a search reasonable or un-
reasonable, whether the warrant requirement must always be 
met, and what constitutes probable cause, have been left to the 
courts to decide. A treatise would be needed to adequately ad-
dress the thicket of legal precedent that has grown up around 
these issues - at least when applied to police enforcing the 
criminal law. 
The study of this body of precedent by school officials 
would be more relevant if it was routinely applied in the school 
environment. However, in the only school case the U.S. Supreme 
Court has decided addressing that subject, New Jersey v. 
T.L.O.,208 the Court majority indicated that it would not apply 
that jurisprudence literally, but would make an exception in the 
school environment. Specifically, "probable cause" is not a rigid 
standard to be uniformly enforced regardless of the state entity 
performing the search or the purpose thereof, but a flexible re-
quirement that may be lowered as situations demand. 
Three basic principles have developed through the Supreme 
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and have been en-
grafted onto its literal language.209 First, the Court fashioned 
specific and limited exceptions to the Amendment's premise 
208. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
209. See id. at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, (1987) 
(giving a similar, though less clear, account). 
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that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.210 Second, 
general police searches, whether conducted pursuant to a war-
rant or under an exception thereto, are "reasonable" if there is 
"probable cause" to believe that a crime has been committed or 
is about to be committed, and that evidence of the crime will be 
found in the place to be searched.2l1 Third, searches that are less 
threatening and less intrusive may be justified, absent a warrant 
or probable cause, by balancing the interests at stake, provided 
that sufficient weight is given to the individual privacy interests 
that are likely to be infringed.212 This too is a "reasonableness" 
standard, lacking probable cause as a rationale, and so depends 
upon the surrounding circumstances for its justification. 
School administrators, exercising their authority to main-
tain security and order within schools, have often searched stu-
dents and their property, generally to unearth contraband, pri-
marily drugs. A threshold question then is whether those public 
officials who are conducting searches to protect and discipline 
their charges are, like police, subject to the prohibitions of the 
Fourth Amendment. The Court answered this question in the 
affirmative in T.L.O. Hence, a brief review of the principal Su-
preme Court cases concerning the Fourth Amendment is 
advisable. 
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United 
States213 established that "the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple, not places." Though this view departs significantly from 
prior Court precedent,2l-t the majority opinion by Justice Stew-
art lacked detail. Therefore, lower courts were forced to turn to 
210. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. I, 20 (1968); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984). 
211. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (announcing 
that an official has probable cause when he is aware of "facts and circumstances [that] 
warrant a prudent man into believing that the offense has been committed"). 
212. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968). 
213. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
214. Previous Supreme Court opinions had focused on whether a particular ·space 
was a "constitutionally protected area" and, if so, requiring that the police must "physi-
cally intrude" into this area for there to be an illegal search. See, e.g., Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1967) (addressing what constitutes a "constitutionally pro-
tected area"); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (adding the "physical in-
trusion" requirement). 
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Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz and what has come 
to be known as the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test.2UI 
The principal focus of attention given this test by courts and 
commentators has been what expectation of privacy is "reasona-
ble" in the eyes of society.216 
Just what expectation is objectively "reasonable" on the 
part of the individual searched, depends upon whether the ex-
pectation of privacy is "justified" under the circumstances. Gen-
erally, an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in any object or act he holds out to the public.217 If how-
ever, a governmental practice "significantly jeopardizes" a legiti-
mate "sense of security," a warrant should be required.218 
215. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Katz u. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
361 (Harlan, J., concurring». Terry was the first U.S. Supreme Court case in which a 
majority of the Court refers to Justice Harlan's opinion as creating a "test." 
Justice Harlan's explanation for the majority's position that the fourth amendment 
"protected people, not places" was stated thus: 
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior de-
cisions is that there is a two-fold requirement, first that a per-
son have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of pri-
vacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' Thus a man's home is, -
for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but ob-
jects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain 
view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to 
keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, 
conversations in the open would not be protected against be-
ing overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the cir-
cumstances would be unreasonable. 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207 (1986) (embracing the Harlan test). 
216. The actual or subjective expectation of privacy "test" might be dismissed as 
providing an "inadequate index of fourth amendment protection" and therefore means 
little apart from the second requirement. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 
(1979). 
One commentator has examined the first part of the test and provided a lucid expla-
nation of how courts should analyze a "subjective" determination of reason~bleness: an 
individual "need not take extraordinary precautions against the specific way in which the 
state conduct[s] a surveillance. [He may, by conduct] demonstrate[] an intention to keep 
activities and things ... private, and ... not knowingly expose them to the open view of 
the public." Note, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725, 753-54 (1985). 
217. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43. 
218. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting), explains 
this point. Harlan suggested that whether or not an individual's reliance on privacy is 
"justified" must be answered by "assessing the nature of a particular practice and the 
likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security balanced against the util-
ity of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement." [d. at 786. 
Harlan's dissent in White touches upon what is perhaps the driving force behind his 
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Another important line of Supreme Court cases, one having 
a more direct bearing on school searches, addresses the "proba-
ble cause" requirement as it applies to regulatory inspections. 
"Probable cause" is central to the right of an individual to 
be secure from unreasonable governmental intrusions. The term 
itself arises in the second part of the Fourth Amendment, com-
monly called the warrant clause. The warrant clause makes it 
clear that search warrants, or arrest warrants, will not be valid 
unless the issuing authority (typically a court or magistrate) has 
been convinced that there is probable cause to issue them. 
Housing inspections, like school searches, do not usually involve 
police, or suspected criminal behavior, and therefore generally 
lack "probable cause" in any literal sense. Are routine housing, 
fire, and health inspections intrusive enough to fall afoul of the 
Fourth Amendment? 
These inspections, like school searches, are generally based 
on public health and safety concerns. Typically, the inspections 
are conducted by employees of administrative agencies, whose 
role it is to ensure compliance with local health and safety regu-
lations. Most inspections are routine and made in the course of 
periodic or geographic inspection programs, although some are 
made in response to specific complaints. 
It is the "routine" nature of such inspections that led the 
Supreme Court to hold in Camara u. Municipal Court of the 
City and County of San Francisc0219 that such searches are gen-
erally "reasonable" and hence the "probable cause" required for 
a "warrant" - if one is insisted upon - will be met "if reasona-
ble legislative or administrative standards' for conducting an 
area inspection are satisfied."220 
concurrence in Katz. Namely, the overriding importance of the word "secure" in the text 
of the fourth amendment. When Katz shifted the focus away from the "place" itself, to 
the relationship between the place and the "person," it may have "release[dl the Fourth 
Amendment ... from the moorings of precedent" so that its scope may now be defined 
by the "logic of its central concepts." EDMUND W. KITCH. KATZ V. UNITED STATES: THE 
LIMITS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 133. Hence, an adult citizen may 
have a more reasonable and legitimate expectation of being secure from a police search 
of his home or person than minor children might from a teacher's search of their school 
desks or lockers. 
219. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
220. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). In 
Camara, the Court pointed to features of housing inspections that support their inherent 
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Camara held that housing inspections do intrude "upon ... 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment"221 primarily be-
cause an individual's private residence is being searched. The 
Court found,' however, that such inspections need only be based 
upon a "reasonable" regulatory goal, and not on probable cause 
to believe that a crime has been committed, or is about to be 
committed, and that evidence of the crime will be found in the 
place to be searched.222 In this respect, administrative probable 
cause is different from criminal probable cause, and a metal de-
tector at the entrance to a school building would doubtless fall 
into the former category. A similar view223 of the "probable 
cause" requirement was taken in T.L.O. 
T.L. O. involved a fourteen year-old student who was ac-
cused of violating a school policy against smoking cigarettes in 
the school bathroom. When the student vehemently denied the 
accusation, the assistant vite-principal searched her purse. He 
found the cigarettes he sought, but continued his quest, eventu-
ally finding paraphernalia and records indicating that the stu-
reasonableness; for example, the fact that such inspections "are neither personal in na-
ture nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, [and) involve a relatively limited 
invasion of the urban citizen's privacy." [d. at 537. 
This portion of Camara only slightly modified the result reached in Frank v. Mary-
land, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). Frank held that a state health inspector need not obtain a 
search warrant as a prerequisite to the criminal prosecution of a householder for refusing 
to permit the inspector to enter his house. The Court reasoned that the inspection was 
only peripherally controlled by the fourth amendment, because the inspector was not 
searching for "evidence of criminal action." Thus, the Court held that the householder 
did not enjoy the full protection of the fourth amendment. 
Frank had also held that a warrant issued after frequent refusals by the householder 
to permit the search need only be based upon "reasonableness" and dispensed with the 
warrant and probable cause requirements. The distinction between the Camara and 
Frank decisions in a petit-criminal context is a separate can of worms, beyond the scope 
of this article. 
221. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. 
222. Id. 
223. For additional cases involving "administrative" searches, see Marshall v. Bar-
low's Inc., 429 U.S. 1347 (1978) (upholding the constitutionality, under Camara and See, 
of a provision in the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) which allowed war-
rantless entry and inspection of work places for OSHA violations); cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 
436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978) (holding that official entries to investigate the cause of a fire 
after the fire had been extinguished did not require a warrant unless such reentries were 
"detached from the initial exigency"); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S 287 (1984) ("[I)f 
reasonable privacy interests remain in the fire-damaged property, the warrant require-
ment applies, and any official entry must be made pursuant to a warrant in the absence 
of consent or exigent circumstances."). 
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dent might be engaged in the sale of marijuana.224 The Supreme 
Court held that, as a public employee, the principal's actions fell 
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment, and that students 
enjoy certain rights of privacy in the school setting. However, no 
warrant was required, nor was "probable cause" of the criminal 
sort necessary, for him to conduct his search. Rather, the Court 
adopted a liberal balancing test: 
[T]he child's interest in privacy must be set 
[against] the substantial interest of teachers and 
administrators in maintaining discipline in the 
classroom and on . school grounds.... 
[M]aintaining security and order in the schools 
requires a degree of flexibility in school discipli-
nary procedures, and we have respected the value 
of preserving the informality of the student-
teacher relationship.22G 
Thus it might be suggested that the Fourth Amendment's 
protections were meant chiefly, although not solely, to protect 
persons suspected of criminal activities from being forced by 
over-zealous civil authorities to surrender their privacy and pos-
sessions by submitting their person or property to a search. 
While school officials are indisputably "state actors" and, conse-
quently, technically subject to the Bill of Rights including the 
Fourth Amendment, less exacting and rigorous standards apply 
when they conduct a search. The distinction between the stan-
dards governing search by law enforcement officers, health offi-
cials, and those regulating searches by school officials, are justi-
fied by the teacher-student relationship and the different 
penalties involved. This "student ... is under [the school's] au-
thority and the penalty handed down by a school official is not 
criminal in nature." 
But what of a situation that arises with increasing fre-
quency; one in which the school official acts in concert with the 
police in conducting a search on school grounds? After all, 
T.L.O. was not objecting to a school disciplinary proceeding, but 
224. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. In the context of criminal law, a "full field strip search" 
of the subject is technically legal if the apprehending officer has a sufficient reason to 
conduct a search in the first place, even though the search goes well beyond the reason 
for the original apprehension. 
225. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-40. 
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to the use of the seized evidence in a delinquency action in Juve-
nile Court.226 Two cases decided in the late 1960's by a federal 
district court in Alabama are particularly instructive on this 
point.227 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to directly address th~ 
Issue. 
The Piazzola and Moore cases both arose from a search of 
individual dormitory rooms, in response to a "drug problem" 
brought to the attention of Troy State University's Dean by the 
Chief of Police of Troy, Alabama.228 Two state narcotic agents, 
accompanied by University officials, searched the rooms of 
Gordon Moore and Frank Piazzola "without search warrants and 
without their consent," and unearthed incriminating evidence.229 
The difference between the two cases lies in the regulation 
that was violated, and the punishments sought to be imposed. 
Piazzola was arrested and convicted for illegal possession of ma-
rijuana,23o while Moore was "indefinitely suspended" from the 
schoo1.231 Each. opinion seems to turn on the "purpose" of the 
search; upholding Moore's dismissal and setting aside Piazzola's 
conviction. 
Because the dormitory search in Piazzola was "instigated 
and in the main executed" by the police, the district court be-
lieved that the "sole purpose" of the search was to obtain evi-
dence in furtherance of a criminal prosecution. Searches of this 
sort are generally held unreasonable unless there is probable 
cause and a warrant, consent or exigency.232 
226. Id. at 329. 
227. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. 
Ala. 1968); Pi82zola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd, 42 F.2d 284 
(5th Cir. 1971). 
228. Piazzola, 316 F. Supp. at 625. Information about the alleged "drug problem" 
came from "unnamed but reliable informers." Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 728. The use of 
informers by police as a source of "probable cause" opens up another can of worms that 
is beyond the scope of this article. 
229. Piazzola, 316 F. Supp. at 625. 
230. Id. 
231. Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 727. 
232. See, e.g., Picha v. Weilgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-21 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (holding 
that the probable cause standard also should apply to searches by school officials in 
which the police are involved). However, as a general rule, a "tag along" search (by po-
lice) is legal if the primary investigator has a sufficient legal basis for his investigation. 
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Moore reached the opposite result, emphasizing the signifi-
cance of the stated or implied "purpose" of the search. Moore 
held that the search was university-initiated, pursuant to a le-
gitimate university mission, namely, to "maintain discipline and 
order," and to enforce a "reasonable" campus regulation. There-
fore, the "administrative" search neither required criminal prob-
able cause nor a search warrant. The Alabama District Court 
was possibly a bit more solicitous of the college student's "pri-
vacy" in Moore than was the Supreme Court of the minor il1 
T.L.O., but not much. Both situations were viewed as somewhat 
"benign" when compared to police searches. 
In T.L.O. the Supreme Court held that because of the "sub-
stantial interest" teachers and administrators had in student 
safety and discipline, their searches could be warrantless and 
need not be based on probable cause. "Rather, the legality of a 
search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness 
under all the circumstances .... "233 
"Reasonableness" was to be analyzed in two stages. First,."a 
search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be 
'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student 
has violated or is violating either public laws or the rules of the 
school."234 This is some "cause," to be sure, but nothing like that 
legally required before a police officer can conduct a warrantless 
search of a criminal suspect. Both are a type of "ends" test. 
Second, the search will be considered "reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 
the first place,"2311 only when "the measures adopted are reason-
ably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively 
intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the na-
ture of the infraction."236 This is a type of "means" test. Thus, 
the Supreme Court has held merely that the search must be 
(and it was) "reasonable" in both its objective (ends) and con-
duct (means); nothing more. 
233. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added); ct. The standard of "reasonableness" 
required in Camara, supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. 
234. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 20 (1968)). 
235. [d. 
236. [d. at 342. 
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The standard is surely lower than that applied to police 
searches of criminal suspects. And it should be unless we are to 
make our schools into armed camps, and teachers into veteran 
police. 
A student - at any level of schooling - also has a cogniza-
ble interest in his or her person and property that school officials 
ought to respect and not violate unless there is some clear threat 
to the academy. The principal in T.L.O. examined the student's 
purse for cigarettes. He had good cause to do so, for she was 
accused of violating a school rule regarding smoking. But the 
facts of the case suggest that T.L.O. was not evidently "guilty" 
of any criminal statute, until an involuntary search of her purse 
went further and produced evidence that she might be engaged 
in drug dealing. The best reason to allow this deeper, more in-
trusive search might be (and was according to the case dicta) 
that the school official plays a custodial role, and is interested 
solely in protecting this student or other students. However, one 
must remember that it is exactly this type of deference to dis-
cretionary state "authority" that lies at the root of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The Supreme Court expressly left open the question 
whether a school official (here, an assistant vice principal) could 
surpass his role as school disciplinarian and hand over the evi-
dence he found to public prosecutors, if police officers could not 
have conducted the same search without violating the Fourth 
Amendment.237 This is the issue judiciously resolved by lower 
237. The Supreme Court has upheld the right to use evidence discovered in a pri-
vate search to procure a criminal conviction. United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109 
(1984); cf. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). However, in these cases, the 
"private" discovery of contraband was not assisted or induced in any way by public au-
thority. Although it is true that "every man" - even a private citizen - must give his 
evidence (with narrow exceptions) at least to grand juries, that is not to say that private 
actors are untainted when they collaborate with public authorities. Moreover, the inves-
tigating authority in T.L.O., Moore and Piazzola was a public official, to whom the 
fourth amendment applies. Thus, the real differences among these cases would appear to 
be whether police authority induces and/or collaborates in the search, and whether the 
evidence is used for internal, disciplinary purposes, or for criminal prosecutions. Educa-
tors have no generalized responsibility to enforce the law, except for situations in which 
schools are assigned some specific monitoring function by statute. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) 
(1982); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1088-1099 (1982). But even these 
circumstances rarely involve responsibility for enforcing public criminal laws. However, 
the possessor of knowledge of criminal conduct could himself be prosecuted as an "acces-
sory after the fact" if he refuses to divulge to enforcement officials the evidence he has. 
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courts in Piazzola and Moore, but virtually ignored, and left un-
answered, in T.L.O. 
Also left unanswered by the T.L.O. Court was the question 
whether a student has a legitimate "expectation of privacy" in 
his or her locker, desk, or other school property provided the 
student for storage.23S Such areas are often searched, and school 
administrators can justly claim that lockers and dormitory 
rooms are school property, merely let to students for their use. 
This ignores the traditional privacy rights of lessees under the 
law, which may be surrendered only in reasonable ways and for 
cause.23e Why should students be treated differently? 
The Fourth Amendment's guarantees are not so narrowly-
framed. Theoretically they protect all citizens (including stu-
dents) from the unwarranted prying of public officials (including 
teachers, principals and deans). Any "search or seizure" of a 
purse, locker, or dormitory room, without an adequate pretext 
238. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338, n.5. Ct. Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662 (lOth Cir. 
1981) (holding that the school had a right to inspect a student's locker by virtue of hav-
ing joint control over it); People v. Overton, 249 N.E.2d 366 (1969) (holding that school 
administrators have the power to consent to a police search of a student's locker). But 
see State v. Engerud, 463 A.2d 934, 943 (1983) (holding that students have an expecta-
tion of privacy in the contents of their lockers as a "home away from home ... where the 
student stores the kind of personal 'effects' protected by the Fourth Amendment.") 
Engerud was joined with T.L.O. in the New Jersey court, where both searches were 
found to violate the fourth amendment. The T.L.O. decision, however, did not mention 
Engerud except to disclaim any position on locker searches. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337 n.5. 
See also Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (w.n. Mich. 1975) (holding that college 
students had the same interest in the privacy of their dormitory rooms as any adult 
would have in their home, dwelling or lodging, under the fourth amendment). Neither 
was the Smyth court willing to enforce the "blanket authorization" to search, contained 
in the school's rental contract for dormitory rooms, at least when adult students were 
accused of acts that were also criminal. And why should public school lockers or desks be 
viewed more favorably than the item searched in T.L.O.: her own purse? 
239. In the classic case, Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), a landlord 
could not consent to the search of rented premises in the absence of the tenant. Accord, 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), involving a city housing inspector's 
warrantless attempt to search a leased ground floor apartment. Of particular interest is a 
California - not a U.S. Supreme Court - case (although it interpreted the fourth 
amendment) that held that a parent could not consent to a police search of his minor 
son's locked toolbox, and that the ensuing, warrantless search violated the minor's con-
stitutional rights. In re Scott K. 595 P.2d 105 (1979); but cf. Moore v. Troy State, 284 F. 
Supp. 725, 731 (1968): "a student who lives in a [campus] dormitory ... which he 'rents' 
from the school waives objection to any reasonable searches conducted pursuant to rea-
sonable ... [school] regulations." Thus, a renter from the school may be treated differ-
ently from other lessees; and a disciplinary search may differ from one by police, enforc-
ing the criminal law. 
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ought to be forbidden. The notion that school officials act in 
parens patriae; that is, that they occupy a parent's position with 
respect to their child's (student's) person or possessions, does 
not really wash.240 Parents and their children are frequently con-
frontational, but parents' prerogatives are protected by domestic 
relations law. Not so the school official. He or she may have the 
most paternal of motives, but just as frequently may act as a 
surrogate for civil authority when investigating a student. 
What should we make of the difference in the outcomes of 
Moore and Piazzola, as applied to the circumstances of T.L.O.? 
It is an oft-cited notion that school officials serve as role models, 
mentors and confidants, acting in the individual student's best 
interests or those of the entire school. 
This view would make more sense if discipline was confined 
to the school environment or, in extreme cases, suspension or 
expulsion was used to either admonish or protect other students. 
In those circumstances, the school official is more constructive 
and less confrontational than a police officer apprehending a 
criminal suspect, and the ensuing school process and punish-
ment is more remedial than punitive. However, when a school 
official passes the fruits of his search to prosecution authorities, 
or collaborates with them in conducting a search, he serves not 
in an educator's role, but as an "agent" of the police. At this 
point, any "benign" motive the official or academy may have 
evaporated, and the search (or consequence thereof) is converted 
into the type the Fourth Amendment was meant to regulate.241 
These "unaddressed" questions in T.L.O. suggest other 
chinks in the armor of Tinker. The T.L.O. outcome was not un-
expected, however, for the general retreat from Constitutional 
protections for students that this article documents was paral-
leled by a similar withdrawal of protections for the criminally 
accused.242 . 
240. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336; In re Scott K., 595 P.2d. 105 (1979). 
241. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342, n.7. The Supreme Court limits its conclusions to 
"searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their authority," although 
the evidence found could be given to prosecutors and not suppressed. Hence, the Court 
in T.L.O. purports not to address the issue presented inPiazzola, namely "the appropri-
ate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in con-
junction with or at the behest of law enforcement officers." Id. (emphasis added). 
242. E.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding if "probable cause" 
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I agree that school children are not adults, and that, in the 
academy, they sacrifice certain rights of autonomy. But there 
ought to be some satisfactory "predicate" in order to search and 
discipline them. For example, if there was a: serious drug or vio-
lence problem at the school, and notice was given that all purses 
and bags would be searched, and metal-detectors were to be 
used at school entrances. This could be justified by the circum-
stances, without warrants or individualized suspicion, and with-
out violating the Fourth Amendment.243 
CONCLUSION 
The point I seek to make here is that students in general, 
and especially minor students, do not remotely enjoy the free-
doms that Tinker seemed to confer on them in 1969. Far from 
enjoying all the civil rights that do not "materially and substan-
tially interfere" with the school's academic mission and need for 
order, students appear to enjoy only those rights that school offi-
cials elect to accord them. The Supreme Court's position has 
evolved (actually, devolved) so much since 1969 that Tinker has 
been rendered nearly obsolete, although never explicitly 
overruled. 
Times have certainly changed since Mary Beth Tinker es-
justifies the search of a lawfully-stopped vehicle, it allows a warrantless search of every 
part of the vehicle that a magistrate could authorize by warrant, including areas "not in 
plain view"); Segura v. United States 468 U.S. 796 (1985) (holding that a non-consensual 
search that discovered drug paraphernalia "in plain view" was not invalid because of 
"administrative delay" in the issuance of a search warrant. The "fruit of the poisonous 
tree" doctrine can be overcome by an "independent source" for the discovery of the 
evidence); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that the accused is not de- ' 
prived of fair trial and effective assistance of counsel if the latter simply refuses to abet 
the accused in his perjury). 
243. As nearly as the facts reveal, neither situation obtained in TL,O., although the 
school apparently had decided that smoking, at least in certain areas, should be 
punished. 
The BROCKTON ENTERPRISE, (Massachusetts), on March 14, 1992, reported that po-
lice secretly installed hidden videotape cameras in a New Ipswich, N.H. high school boys 
room, with the principal's permission. The purpose was allegedly to eavesdrop on drug 
transactions, drug use and vandalism. The need for the cameras was not documented, 
although the local police chief said that it did lead to arrests. Neither the students, su-
perintendent nor the school board were informed. Was there an adequate predicate for 
this intrusion into school privacy? How will students attending the school relate to 
school leadership in the future? Is the harm done likely to outweigh the good 
accomplished? 
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tablished her right to wear a black armband to school. Times 
changed, and with them the law. 
if Tinker offered unprecedented, and perhaps unworkable, 
protections for students, today's school officials appear to have 
been given too much authority to regulate the behavior of public 
primary and secondary school pupils. It is almost as if Justice 
Black's dissenting view in Tinker (that "children should be seen 
and not heard") has become the law of the land. All this without 
Tinker being reversed, or even cited unfavorably.244 
Does it not seem that the best answer to this inevitable ebb 
and flow of Constitutional interpretation - favoring first stu-
dents and then teachers and schools - lies between the extreme 
positions taken first in Tinker and later in Hazelwood and 
Bethel School? While it seems quite evident that schools cannot 
effectively pursue their mission if forced to operate at the 
threshold of "material and substantial disruption," neither 
ought students to be cast once again as "closed circuit recipi-
ents" of what the school chooses to offer. Admittedly, schools 
have grown more tense and violent, but the Tinker formula al-
lows school officials to take appropriate precautionary steps and 
disciplinary action when it is justified. The administrative ac-
tions in T.L.O., Bethel School and Hazelwood, however, evi-
dence as much desire to assert authority and avoid public em-
barrassment and friction, as they do to regulate schools for 
educational or safety reasons. Students are neither deceived nor 
educated by such heavy-handed regulations, and the isolation 
they create ill-prepares students for the prudent judgments they 
will eventually have to make in the public "marketplace." 
I have never understood why schools did not attempt to 
turn various threats to their educational mission into "learning 
experiences" for students, the better to teach them in the aca-
demic "marketplace" about the collision of opinions and values 
that occur in the public marketplace, beyond the school and its 
control. In reality, these collisions are numerous and often vio-
lent. Choosing the right course can have enormous personal and 
societal import, but there will be no teacher to point the way; far 
244. In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), both majority and dissenting 
opinions cited Tinker as binding precedent. 
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less to dictate it. Whether our school-educated citizenry makes a 
good choice in these situations depends much more upon 
whether teachers have inculcated in their students values of 
judgment and restraint, than whether the day has gone smoothly 
and the mathematics lesson was completed. 
If the power to control student behavior is exercised to sup-
press student initiative, which is invariably probing and often 
intentionally provocative, and not to prepare students for a pub-
lic marketplace that offers many options and knows few re-
straints, then Mary Beth will have had reason indeed to wear a 
black arm band. 
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